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 In the hierarchy of constitutional offenses to free speech 
principles, content discrimination is near the very top. Since the early 
1970s, the Court has identified laws that regulate speech on the basis of 
its content as presumptively unconstitutional.1 Content discrimination 
is considered an indication that the government is tipping the scales in 
public debate, the central ill against which the free speech clause 
protects.2 Unless there is a narrow exception in play, content-based 
laws are subject to strict scrutiny, upheld only if the government can 
show that the regulation is narrowly tailored to satisfy a compelling 
interest.3 Only a handful of laws have satisfied such an exacting test.4 
The commitment to content neutrality has become so central to free 
speech doctrine that the Court has brought it to bear to strike down 
laws that are far afield from those that appear to be pose a risk that 
“official suppression of ideas is afoot.”5 
 But at the apex of free speech affronts is not content 
discrimination but viewpoint discrimination. While content-based laws 
make regulatory choices on the basis of the topic or subject matter of 
the speech in question (for example, “no speech about abortion in 
                                               
* Professor of Law and Dean’s Distinguished Scholar, Boston College. The author 
thanks Marissa Lafayette and Matthew Burton for excellent research assistance. 
Thanks also to William Marshall, Geoffrey Stone, David Olson, and students in the 
2019 Supreme Court Experience seminar and 2019 Speech and Religion course at 
Boston College Law School for help in thinking through these issues. 
1 See Paul B. Stephan III, The First Amendment and Content Discrimination, 68 Va. 
L. Rev. 203 (1982) (pointing to the Court’s announcement in Police Dept v Mosley, 
408 US 92, 95 (1972), that “above all else, the First Amendment means that 
government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its 
subject matter, or its content.”). 
2 See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 Wm & 
Mary L Rev 189 (1983). 
3 Reed v Town of Gilbert, 135 S Ct 2218 (2015). 
4 See, for example, Williams-Yulee v Florida Bar, 575 U.S. 433 (2015). 
5 See Reed, 135 S Ct at 2327-38 (Kagan concurring in the judgment)(critiquing 
Court’s decision as an overly aggressive application of its skepticism of content 
discrimination beyond “its intended function”). 
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public parks”), viewpoint-based laws make regulatory choices on the 
basis of the point of view of the speaker within a content category of 
speech (“no anti-choice speech in public parks”). The constitutional 
harm of content bias is setting aside categories of speech for greater or 
lesser protection based on its subject matter; the constitutional harm of 
viewpoint bias is setting aside speech within categories for greater or 
lesser protection based on its political, cultural, social, or economic 
point of view. Content bias skews debate by limiting categories of 
speech; viewpoint bias skews debate by limiting points of view within 
categories.  
 Content-based laws require strict scrutiny, but the Court has 
made clear that viewpoint bias is even worse than content bias. Justice 
Samuel Alito has called laws that discriminate on the basis of viewpoint 
“poison to a free society,” and there is little apparent disagreement on 
this point among his colleagues. While some members of the Court 
have argued that the doctrinal fixation on content bias has gone too 
far,6 no current justice has come close to suggesting that the Court’s 
fixation on ferreting out viewpoint bias is inappropriate. The unanimity 
is striking. While there has been a handful of instances where there was 
disagreement as to whether a specific law was viewpoint-based or not,7 
there has not been a single instance in the last fifty years of the Court 
characterizing a law as viewpoint-based and nevertheless ruling that 
the law satisfied strict scrutiny.8  
 Notwithstanding the Court’s uniform condemnation of 
viewpoint bias, it is rarely a doctrinal game changer. A law that makes 
distinctions according to viewpoint also, by definition, makes 
distinctions according to content. A ban on anti-choice speech, for 
example, is both viewpoint-based and content-based. And because 
content discrimination usually triggers strict scrutiny by itself,  the 
added constitutional affront of viewpoint discrimination does not 
                                               
6 See Reed, 135 S Ct at 2328 (Kagan, concurring in the judgment) (arguing the Court’s 
fixation on content neutrality has led it to overreach, and the Court should instead 
“administer our content-regulation doctrine with a dose of common sense”); Iancu v 
Brunetti, 139 S Ct 2294, 2304 (2019) (Breyer, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (“Unfortunately, the Court has sometimes applied these rules—especially the 
category of “content discrimination”—too rigidly.”). 
7 See, for example, Brunetti, 139 S Ct 2294; Rosenberger v Rector and Visitors of 
Univ of Va, 515 US 819 (1995). 
8 In R.A.V. v City of St. Paul, 508 US 377, 395-96 (1992), the Court conceded that the 
“hate speech” ordinance at issue was based on a compelling interest, but held that the 
ordinance was not narrowly tailored to satisfy that interest. See below at notes 63-64. 
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increase the level of judicial scrutiny in the run of cases.9 Viewpoint 
bias is only material as a matter of doctrine in those cases in which the 
Court might otherwise be open to accepting some level of content basis 
in a legal framework — such as in cases pertaining to commercial 
speech,10 limited public fora,11 or “low-value” speech such as fighting 
words.12 In those cases, if the Court sees viewpoint bias, it ratchets up 
the level of scrutiny. In some cases, the Court has made clear that the 
viewpoint bias of the law increased the level of scrutiny over what 
would have been applied otherwise, but was vague in articulating what 
the final level of scrutiny should be.13 In others, the Court has applied 
strict scrutiny to speech restrictions that would, but for the viewpoint 
bias, otherwise receive only rational basis review.14 
 In any event, over the past few decades the viewpoint 
discrimination of a law has been dispositive in only a handful of 
Supreme Court cases. That means that the Court has had few 
opportunities to articulate the contours and limits of what amounts to 
viewpoint bias. The core of what constitutes viewpoint bias may be 
                                               
9 As a theoretical matter, viewpoint bias could have doctrinal effects even in cases in 
which content bias already requires strict scrutiny in that viewpoint bias would make 
it even more difficult for the state to show that the biased law is narrowly tailored to 
serve a compelling interest. Not only would the state have to show a compelling 
interest to regulate specific content but to regulate content of a specific point of view. 
The tailoring analysis, too, would be doubly difficult. The Court implied something 
like this in R.A.V., when it conceded that the St. Paul ordinance served a compelling 
interest but failed tailoring. See below at notes 63-64. But the Court has never struck 
down a viewpoint-biased law as failing strict scrutiny that the Court said would have 
survived a content-based application of strict scrutiny. This difference is thus mostly 
theoretical only. 
10 Central Hudson Gas & Elec Corp v Pub Svc Comm of NY, 447 US 557 (1980). 
11 See, eg, Good News Club v Milford Central School, 533 US 98, 107 (2001); 
Rosenberger, 515 US at 831; Lamb’s Chapel v Center Moriches Union Free School 
Dist, 508 U S 384, 392-93 (1993). See also Legal Services Corporation v. Velazquez, 
531 US 533, 544 (2001). As Justice Alito says in Tam: “When government creates 
such a forum, in either a literal or “metaphysical” sense… some content- and speaker-
based restrictions may be allowed… However, even in such cases, what we have 
termed ‘viewpoint discrimination’ is forbidden.” Matal v Tam, 137 S Ct 1744, 1763 
(2017) (quoting Rosenberger, 515 US at 830-31). 
12 See R.A.V., 508 US 377. 
13 See, for example, Tam, 137 S Ct at 1764 (Court need not decide level of scrutiny 
because provision would fail even intermediate review) (plurality); Sorrell v IMS 
Health, 564 U.S. 552, 571 (2011) (describing level of review for viewpoint-based 
regulation of commercial speech as “heightened”). 
14 See R.A.V., 508 US 377 (applying strict scrutiny to a viewpoint-based regulation of 
fighting words). 
 Trademarks, Hate Speech, and Viewpoint Bias 
 4 
more or less clear — when the government regulates one point of view 
within a category of speech differently from others. But the edges of the 
doctrine are still being defined.  
 One enduring puzzle dates from the Court’s most famous 
modern viewpoint discrimination case, R.A.V. v St. Paul, from 1992.15 
There, the city made it a misdemeanor to place “on public or private 
property a symbol … including, but not limited to, a burning cross or 
Nazi swastika, which … arouses anger, alarm, or resentment in others 
on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender.”16  This ordinance 
was clearly content-based — it made distinctions among symbols on 
the basis of the content of the communication. But the law’s content 
basis was not enough to trigger strict scrutiny alone, because 
(according to the Minnesota Supreme Court, whose interpretation was 
controlling for purposes of the case) the ordinance only applied to 
“fighting words,” a low-value category of speech that the Court had 
long considered “not within the area of constitutionally protected 
speech.”17 But the United States Supreme Court nevertheless applied 
strict scrutiny and struck down the ordinance as discriminating on the 
basis of viewpoint. 
 One aspect of R.A.V. has remained unclear since its 
announcement nearly thirty years ago. What exactly made the St. Paul 
ordinance viewpoint based?18 The text of the ordinance appears to ban 
a specific mode or manner of speech — fighting words that also 
contained some kind of racial, sexual, or religious epithet. The city 
argued that the law only applied to “racial, religious, or gender-specific 
symbols” and the Court interpreted the ordinance to mean that the use 
of such epithets “would be prohibited to proponents of all views.” In 
other words, the ordinance was arguably an even-handed limitation of 
a mode or manner of speech — the use of epithets. But the Court 
nevertheless held the ordinance to be viewpoint biased. One way to 
read R.A.V., then, is that specific limits on the mode or manner of 
speech can trigger the Court’s ire against viewpoint discrimination.  
 That was not the only way to read the ordinance, and it is not 
the only way to read the Court’s opinion in R.A.V.. Was the ordinance 
                                               
15 Id. 
16 Id at 380. 
17 Id at 383, citing Chaplinsky v New Hampshire, 315 US 568, 571-72 (1942). 
18 Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 Harv L Rev 741, 762-63 & n 78 
(1993) (R.A.V. ordinance not viewpoint-based in practice); Elena Kagan, The 
Changing Faces of First Amendment Neutrality: R.A.V. v St. Paul, Rust v Sullivan, 
and the Problem of Content-Based Underinclusion, 1992 S Ct Rev 29, 69-71 (R.A.V. 
ordinance viewpoint-based in practice). 
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viewpoint-based because of the underlying message of the speech, the 
idea expressed? Or was it because of the mode or manner regulated? In 
R.A.V. itself, the action that triggered the arrest under the ordinance 
was the burning of a cross on the lawn of a black family. The mode — 
the burning of the cross — expressed the idea — racial hatred. Justice 
Antonin Scalia’s opinion for the Court muddled the analysis and left 
unclear whether the constitutional infirmity of the ordinance was its 
selection of a specific viewpoint for greater punishment or its selection 
of a specific mode of communication for greater punishment.   
 The difference between these two possible readings matters for a 
range of possible applications. For example, if limits on specific modes 
or manners of speech are deemed to be viewpoint discrimination, then 
it may be “virtually impossible” to enact a speech code at a university 
that would not trigger strict scrutiny.19 Or, limits on sexually explicit 
speech in the workplace could be seen as constitutionally 
problematic.20  
 Notwithstanding the lack of clarity in R.A.V. and the important 
implications of the definitional uncertainty, the Court has not taken the 
opportunity to clarify whether specific limits on the mode and manner 
of communication can amount to viewpoint bias. What we have known 
for the last generation is that viewpoint bias is the worst kind of First 
Amendment harm — but that its contours remain unclear. In the words 
of Justice Sonia Sotomayor, “the line between viewpoint-based and 
viewpoint-neutral content discrimination can be ‘slippery.’”21 
                                               
19 David L. Hudson Jr. & Lata Nott, Hate Speech and Campus Speech Codes, 
Freedom Forum Institute, March 2017 (last accessed Oct 10, 2019) (“while speech 
codes faced an uphill battle under the constitutional precedent in place before R.A.V., 
this decision made it virtually impossible for a speech code to pass constitutional 
muster”)(quoting S. Douglas Murray, The Demise of Campus Speech Codes, 24 West 
St U L Rev 247, 264-65  (1997); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: 
Principles and Practices 1013-14 (3d ed 2006) (R.A.V. “makes it difficult for hate 
speech codes to survive judicial analysis; if they prohibit only some forms of hate, 
they will be invalidated as impermissible content-based discrimination”); id at 1007 
(“there is a strong presumption against content-based discrimination within 
categories of unprotected speech”). 
20 See below at note 45. 
21 Brunetti, 139 S Ct at 2313 (Sotomayor, concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(quoting Caroline Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech is Both Private and 
Governmental, 83 NYU L Rev 605, 651 (2008)). See also Brunetti, 139 S Ct at 2306 
(Breyer, concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“As for the concepts of ‘viewpoint 
discrimination’ and ‘content discrimination,’ I agree with Justice Sotomayor that the 
boundaries between them may be difficult to discern.”); Rosenberger, 515 US at 831 
(“[T]he distinction is not a precise one”). 
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 But the Court has recently offered help. 
 In two cases over the last three Terms, the Supreme Court 
struck down provisions of the Lanham Act, the federal law governing 
the registration of trademarks, on the grounds that the laws 
discriminated on the basis of viewpoint. In the first, the 2017 case of 
Matal v Tam,22 the Court declared unconstitutional the provision of 
the Act that required the trademark office to refuse registration to 
those marks that “disparaged” individuals or groups. In the second, in 
Iancu v Brunetti from 2019, the Court ruled against the provision that 
prohibited the registration of marks that were “immoral” or 
“scandalous.”23   
 According to the Court, both were straightforward viewpoint 
cases. Disparaging marks could not be trademarked, yet non-
disparaging marks could. Marks celebrating immorality and 
scandalousness could not be registered, yet marks celebrating civility 
and decency could. The provisions put the government’s thumb on the 
scale in favor of racial harmony and morality by creating a regulatory 
framework that benefitted speech consistent with those views and 
refused benefits to speech inconsistent with those views. The Court 
reaffirmed its long-standing view that viewpoint discrimination is an 
“egregious form of content discrimination” and a presumptive First 
Amendment violation.24 It was in his Brunetti concurrence where 
Justice Alito made his statement, mentioned above, that “viewpoint 
discrimination is poison to a free society.”25  
 Tam was largely unhelpful as a matter of definition and 
doctrine, however, because the Court struck down the disparagement 
provision without a majority opinion. Justice Alito wrote for himself 
and three justices; Justice Anthony Kennedy headed up another 
contingent of four.26 Both opinions described the disparagement 
provision as a violation of the First Amendment’s bar on viewpoint 
discrimination, but arrived at that destination by different routes. 
Doctrinal uncertainty remained.  
 But this past Term’s decision in Brunetti helped matters 
considerably. The Court struck down the provisions of the Lanham Act 
                                               
22 137 S Ct 1744 (2017). 
23 139 S Ct 2294 (2019). 
24 See Rosenberger, 515 US at 829 (1995). See also Brunetti, 139 S Ct 2294 at 2299 
(quoting Rosenberger); Lamb’s Chapel, 508 US at 394 (“[T]he First Amendment 
forbids the government to regulate speech in ways that favor some viewpoints or 
ideas at the expense of others”). 
25 139 S Ct 2294 at 2302. 
26 Justice Gorsuch took no part in the case. 
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prohibiting the registration of “immoral” and “scandalous” marks as 
viewpoint biased. The Court’s opinion was written by Justice Elena 
Kagan, and the main oppositional opinion — one concurring in part 
and dissenting in part — was penned by Justice Sonia Sotomayor. The 
conflict between the two in fact illuminated what appears to be an 
important area of agreement that, in all likelihood, is sufficient to 
control a majority of the Court. That agreement is this: that worries 
about viewpoint bias do not ordinary come into play when the 
government regulates the mode and manner of communication as 
opposed to the ideas conveyed. 
 Such a principle would have a number of implications. Perhaps 
the most important is that R.A.V. is less significant in First 
Amendment doctrine than it has seemed for thirty years. Also, some 
kinds of speech codes could survive First Amendment challenge, as 
long as they apply in certain fora and are aimed at the mode and 
manner of communication rather than the ideas expressed. Another 
implication would be that it would be possible for Congress to rewrite 
the now-defunct provisions of the Lanham Act to survive First 
Amendment challenge and also satisfy much of Congress’s original 
goals. 
 This essay proceeds as follows. I first describe two kinds of 
viewpoint bias, the first of which is “traditional” bias and the second is 
“manner” bias. Traditional bias is when the government puts its finger 
on the scale in a cultural, social, ideological, or political debate by 
enforcing some kind of speech restriction against one side and not 
against the other. Manner bias is when the government restricts a 
mode or manner of communication. Manner bias is indeed bias — it is 
the government enforcing a view that a certain type of communication 
is to be regulated in a different way than other kinds of 
communication. But it is a bias of a different kind than traditional 
viewpoint discrimination. 
 In Part II, I describe the lack of clarity in R.A.V. and other cases 
as to whether manner bias is constitutionally problematic. In Part III, I 
set out why the best reading of Brunetti is to exclude manner bias from 
the category of viewpoint bias the Court recognizes as constitutional 
“poison.” Finally, in Part IV, I describe what I believe to be the best 
understanding of the doctrine of viewpoint bias after Brunetti and 
explain some of the implications of this doctrinal understanding. 
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I. CONTENT BIAS AND TWO TYPES OF VIEWPOINT BIAS 
 
 Consider a series of hypothetical local sign ordinances. The first 
reads: 
 
 Signs on Private Property: Signs on private property are 
prohibited without a permit. Exempt from this prohibition shall be 
political signs (which shall be no larger than 20 square feet in 
size), ideological signs, (which shall be no larger than 16 square 
feet in size), and temporary signs indicating directions to an event 
(which shall be no larger than 6 square feet). 
  Ordinances such as this are ubiquitous in the United States.27 
Cities and towns regulate the location, size, appearance, of signs in 
order to guard against the visual clutter and distraction that the 
absence of such ordinances would engender. And one might think it is 
reasonable for cities and towns to make some distinctions among the 
kinds of signs when it creates such ordinances. 
 But this hypothetical ordinance is a simplified version of the 
ordinance the Court struck down in Reed v Town of Gilbert. The Court 
ruled that the ordinance created “content-based restrictions of speech 
that cannot survive strict scrutiny.”28 As the Court explained, the 
regulations applicable to a particular sign “depend entirely on the 
communicative content of the sign.”29 According to the Court, 
government regulations of speech that depend on the content of the 
speech raise the possibility that the government is placing its thumb on 
the scale of public debate. Content-based regulations are 
“presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the 
government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling 
state interests.”30 
 Is this first ordinance viewpoint based? In a way, yes. The 
ordinance makes judgments about the allowable size of signs based on 
the subject matter of the speech conveyed by the sign. Political signs 
can be one particular size, ideological signs must be smaller, and 
                                               
27 See Reed, 135 S Ct at 2236 (Kagan concurring in judgment)(“Countless cities and 
towns across America have adopted ordinances regulating the posting of signs, while 
exempting certain categories of signs based on their subject matter.”) For a critique of 
Reed’s reasoning and a description of why it has potentially broad-ranging impacts, 
see Genevieve Lakier, Reed v Town of Gilbert, Arizona, and the Rise of the 
Anticlassificatory First Amendment, 2016 S Ct Rev 233 (2016). 
28 Id at 2224. 
29 Id at 2222. 
30 Id at 2226. 
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directional signs smaller still. This hierarchy implies that the town had 
a viewpoint about the importance of political speech and the lesser 
importance of other kinds of speech. Political speech was sufficiently 
crucial to the town that its regulation is less intrusive than other kinds 
of speech.  
 But this classification of speech, even if it is based on a view 
about the relative importance of various subject matters, is not what 
the Court considers viewpoint discrimination. Justice Clarence 
Thomas, writing for the Court, made clear that the ordinance in Reed 
was not to be considered viewpoint-based even though it established 
such a hierarchy. The Ninth Circuit below had opined that the 
ordinance should survive because it was not viewpoint based. In 
response, Thomas emphasized that content-based discrimination was 
enough to raise the level of judicial scrutiny and the ordinance was not 
required to be viewpoint-based to trigger strict scrutiny. The sign 
ordinance was a “paradigmatic example of content-based 
discrimination.” This was true “even if it does not target viewpoints 
within that subject matter.”31 
 The distinction between content-based and viewpoint-based 
laws, then, is the difference between creating categories of speech for 
special treatment and creating advantages or disadvantages within 
those categories based on points of view. This is true even if the 
creation of the categories is based, as it would have to be, on some 
government view about the merits, importance, or harms flowing from 
different categories of speech. For an ordinance to discriminate on the 
basis of viewpoint, the views differentiated have to be about something 
exogenous to the category rather than endogenous to it. The Court has 
sometimes referred to this distinction as the difference between 
“subject matter” and “particular views taken by speakers on a 
subject.”32  
 This distinction between content and viewpoint, assumed by the 
Court in Reed, makes sense. If the categorization of speech was itself a 
viewpoint, then there would be no difference between a content-based 
statute and a viewpoint-based statute. If the creation of a category of 
                                               
31 Reed, 135 S Ct at 2223. The definitive scholarly treatment of subject matter 
distinctions within free speech law remains Geoffrey R. Stone, Restrictions of Speech 
Because of Its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject Matter Restrictions, 46 U Chi L 
Rev 81 (1978). 
32 Rosenberger, 515 US at 829. See id at 895 (Souter dissenting) (“It is precisely this 
element of taking sides in a public debate that identifies viewpoint discrimination and 
makes it the most pernicious of all distinctions based on content.”). 
 Trademarks, Hate Speech, and Viewpoint Bias 
 10 
speech is viewpoint discrimination — because it would imply a point of 
view about that category — then viewpoint bias would collapse into 
content bias.33 
 Now consider a second hypothetical ordinance. A city council 
adopts the following sign ordinance: 
 
 Signs on Private Property: Signs on private property are 
prohibited without a permit. Exempt from this prohibition shall be 
political signs, which shall be no larger than 20 square feet in size. 
But in no case shall a property owner erect a sign advocating 
Communism. 
 
Such an ordinance would discriminate on the basis of viewpoint. 
Within the category of political signs one point of view — support of 
Communism — is more heavily regulated than competing points of 
view, such as the advocacy of capitalism or opposition to Communism. 
The government is putting its thumb on the scale of public debate in 
favor of one position and against another. This is a violation of a core 
principle of the First Amendment that the government may not 
regulate speech because of the ideas expressed. We do not see many of 
these blatant facial classifications in modern cases.34 They are so 
                                               
33 In Rosenberger, Justice Souter in dissent accused the Court of doing this very 
thing.  The University of Virginia refused funds for a student-run religious newspaper 
on the basis of a guideline prohibiting the use of student activity fees for any 
“religious activity,” defined as any activity that “primarily promotes or manifests a 
particular belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate reality.” 515 US at 825. Justice 
Souter dissented in the case, saying that this provision did not embody viewpoint 
discrimination because it excluded an entire category of subject matter from funding, 
whether it was to promote a Christian, Muslim, Buddhist, or even atheistic point of 
view. To Souter, the rule “den[ied] funding for the entire subject matter of religious 
apologetics.” Id at 896 (Souter, J, dissenting). But Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the 
Court interpreted the guideline differently, saying the “University does not exclude 
religion as a subject matter but selects for disfavored treatment those student 
journalistic efforts with religious editorial viewpoints.” Id at 831. The university had 
identified a “prohibited perspective, not the general subject matter” for disfavored 
treatment. Id. For a critique of the Court’s understanding of viewpoint bias in 
Rosenberger, see Kent Greenawalt, Viewpoints From Olympus, 96 Colum L Rev 697 
(1996). 
34 One example was the ordinance at issue in American Booksellers Association v. 
Hudnut, 771 F2d 323 (7th Cir 1985) aff’d mem 475 US 1001 (1986). There, an 
Indianapolis ordinance prohibited “pornography” defined as “graphic sexually 
explicit subjugation of women” that also met several other criteria focused on the 
depiction’s degradation of women. Depictions of the subjugation of people not 
presenting as women were not regulated, nor were the depictions of women in a 
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clearly problematic that they do not easily win adoption, either out of a 
shared commitment to First Amendment principles or out of fear of 
litigation that will result in a quick and embarrassing defeat.35 
 For the purpose of this article, I will call this kind of law as 
exhibiting “traditional” viewpoint bias. Traditional bias is the kind of 
bias that occurs when within a category of speech one viewpoint is 
regulated differently from others. The viewpoint that is regulated has 
to be exogenous to, or a subset within, the category. This will become 
clearer in comparison to a third hypothetical ordinance.  
 Consider a third ordinance that reads as follows: 
 
 Signs on Private Property: Signs on private property are 
prohibited without a permit or unless they fall into certain exempt 
categories [detailed elsewhere]. But in no case shall signs contain 
profanity. 
 
Such an ordinance limiting profanity would not be like the first 
ordinance above. It regulates content, to be sure. One can only 
determine whether a sign contains profanity prohibited by the 
ordinance by looking at the content of the sign. But the ordinance 
focuses on the mode or manner of the communication rather than the 
subject matter or issue area of communication. The profanity ban does 
not “single[] out specific subject matter for differential treatment,”36 
delineating signs for different levels of regulation based on the subject 
matter of the informational content the sign contains. 
 Nor is this ordinance based on viewpoint like the second 
hypothetical above. It does not make distinctions within a category of 
                                               
position of equality, no matter how sexually explicit. The Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit correctly held that the statute was viewpoint based, and the Supreme 
Court summarily affirmed. For such a law to survive, it would have to satisfy strict 
scrutiny. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Anti-Pornography Legislation as Viewpoint-
Discrimination, 9 Harv J of L & Pub Pol 461 (1986). 
35 The viewpoint bias of a law need not appear on its face. A facially neutral law 
regulating speech that is motivated by a desire to benefit or hurt a specific viewpoint 
and implemented to do so will also be seen as discriminating on the basis of 
viewpoint. See Ward v Rock Against Racism, 491 US 781, 791 (1989) (“The 
government’s purpose is the controlling consideration.”). See also Geoffrey R. Stone, 
Content Neutral Restrictions, 54 U Chi L Rev 46, 56 (1987) (“A central task of first 
amendment jurisprudence is to ferret out improper motivations when they in fact 
exist.”); Lawrence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 794 (2d ed 1988) (law 
should be deemed content-based if it is discriminatory on its face or it was “motivated 
by (i.e., would not have occurred but for) an intent to single our constitutionally 
protected speech for control or penalty”). 
36 Reed, 135 S Ct at 2223. 
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speech based on viewpoints exogenous to, or a subset within, that 
category. It does not, for example, punish profanity against incumbents 
but permit profanity against political challengers. It does not prohibit 
profanity aimed at women but allow profanity aimed at men. It does 
not allow profanity aimed at anti-abortion protesters but prohibit it 
when aimed at pro-choice protesters. 
  Nevertheless, the anti-profanity ordinance does contain a 
viewpoint and regulates speech on the basis of that viewpoint. The law 
is inherently based on the view that profanity is of lower value than 
non-profanity. A regulator could have this view about profanity for a 
number of reasons. It could be that the law is based on the notion that 
profanity is uncivil discourse, or that it is likely to irritate or enrage 
passers-by, or that the appearance of profane signs will be harmful to 
property values, or that ubiquitous profanity decays the civility that 
some citizens want their neighborhoods to characterize. A ban on 
communication that is profane undoubtedly embeds within it a 
viewpoint about profanity.  
 This point can be generalized. Any content-based limit on the 
mode or manner of speech embeds within it a viewpoint about the 
propriety of that mode or manner. A ban on profane speech contains a 
viewpoint about profanity. A ban on sexually explicit speech embeds 
within it a viewpoint about sexual explicitness. A ban on deceptive 
speech embeds within it a viewpoint about deception. Other examples 
arise as well. A ban on racial epithets in schools embeds within it a view 
of the propriety of epithets as compared to other modes of speech. A 
requirement that signs be written in English embeds within it a view 
that English is superior for that purpose than other languages. For 
purposes of this essay, I will refer to the kind of bias contained in 
content-based restrictions on the mode or manner of speech as 
“manner” bias.37  
                                               
37 One clarification is necessary here. The examples in the text pertain to limits on the 
mode or manner of speech that are attentive to the content of the speech. A ban on 
sexually explicit speech, profanity, deception, or racial epithets are limits that can 
only be determined by looking at the substance of the speech in question. So the 
viewpoint embedded in the limit is a viewpoint about speech. And the question 
considered by this article is whether that kind of “manner” viewpoint bias is the kind 
of viewpoint discrimination that the Court considers presumptively unconstitutional. 
 Other regulations of mode or manner are content neutral. For example, if a 
sign ordinance banned signs written in crayon, that would be a limit on the mode or 
manner of speech, but the limit would not discriminate on the basis of content. 
Similarly, a ban on graffiti on public buildings or a limit on the volume of sound 
trucks are both limits on the mode or manner of speech but would not be content-
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 One might think that manner bias does not present the kinds of 
concerns that the doctrinal fixation on viewpoint bias is meant to 
address. Limits on the mode and manner of communication are 
ubiquitous, which might suggest that few regulators, legislators, or 
judges believe that such limits “give rise to an inference of 
impermissible government motive”38 or present the “realistic 
possibility that official suppression of ideas is afoot.”39 It would not be 
unreasonable to think of these restrictions on mode and manner as 
being neutral vis-a-vis free speech values and principles.  
 But the lack of neutrality of a limit on mode or manner becomes 
clearer when there is a salient cultural or political debate about the 
propriety of the mode or manner of communication. In other words, 
when there is a public debate about communication itself, limits on the 
mode and manner of communication will indeed skew that debate. 
When there is public debate about whether certain modes of 
communication are proper, a government regulation of those modes 
will act as viewpoint discrimination in that discourse.  
 Consider a leading case on profanity, Federal Communications 
Commission v Pacifica Foundation.40 An FM radio station broadcast 
George Carlin’s famous satiric monologue about the seven “filthy 
words” not allowed on public air waves. The Court upheld the FCC’s 
efforts to impose sanctions on the station for violating regulations 
proscribing “indecent” language.   
 The Court did not consider the regulation of profanity as 
viewpoint biased, and it was correct that the regulation did not raise 
traditional viewpoint problems.41 A restriction on profanity would 
                                               
based. These examples also embed in them a view about the value of crayons, graffiti, 
or loud noises. Indeed, all laws embed within them a viewpoint about the activity that 
the law regulates. But those viewpoints do not even arguably raise issues of free 
speech, since the viewpoint at issue is not about speech but about something else. A 
murder statute may embed within it a viewpoint about the propriety of murder, but 
that does not make it problematic under the First Amendment. It is only even 
arguably problematic as a matter of free speech doctrine when the regulation of a 
mode of manner of speech is content-attentive. That is the focus of this article. 
38 Reed, 135 S Ct at 2237 (Kagan concurring). 
39 Davenport v Washington Ed Assn, 551 US 177, 189 (2007) (quoting R.A.V., 505 US 
at 390). 
40 438 US 726 (1978). 
41 See Pacifica, 438 US at 745-46 & n 22 (“The monologue does present a point of 
view; it attempts to show that the words it uses are ‘harmless,’ and that our attitudes 
toward them are ‘essentially silly.’ … The Commission objects not to this point of 
view, but to the way in which it is expressed. The belief that these words are harmless 
does not necessarily confer a First Amendment privilege to use them while 
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apply neutrally in all discussions or debates (or comedy routines) 
focused on exogenous issues. Both George Carlin — politically liberal — 
and Roseanne Barr — politically conservative — would be limited by 
such a regulation, and the ban on profanity would apply uniformly to 
discussions about taxes, race relations, gender roles, and climate 
change. In that respect, the ban on profanity is neutral. But in other 
respects a ban on profanity is not neutral at all in that it embeds within 
it a view about the propriety of profanity. Carlin’s monologue is itself a 
good illustration of this. His monologue was, in part, a broad attack on 
social prudishness, especially as embodied by limits on what was 
deemed appropriate on the public airways. And the speech regulation 
was about that very issue. In a debate about social prudishness, a 
regulation requiring prudishness acts as a government thumb on the 
scale to benefit one side of that debate and limit another. The 
advocates of profanity are hamstrung by the inability to use profanity 
to shock, surprise, challenge, titillate, and enliven the discussion. To 
limit Carlin’s use of profanity was to force him to adopt a schoolmarm’s 
norms in a debate about those norms.42 
 Limits on sexually explicit speech raise analogous problems of 
bias. There is a salient debate on whether, and to what extent, sexually 
explicit speech should be regulated. While obscenity meeting the 
definition set out in Miller v California is considered low-value speech 
and its regulation is not typically subject to strict scrutiny,43 non-
obscene, sexually explicit speech remains protected by the First 
Amendment. Nevertheless, limits on such speech appear as a part of 
                                               
proselytizing, just as the conviction that obscenity is harmless does not license one to 
communicate that conviction by the indiscriminate distribution of an obscene 
leaflet.”) 
42 One can imagine situations in which the opponents of profanity (or, for example, 
sexually explicit speech or epithets) use profanity (or sexually explicit speech or 
epithets) in their efforts to illustrate how distasteful profanity (or sexually explicit 
speech or epithets) can be. In that way, a limit on the mode or manner of speech 
operates to limit both sides of the debate about that mode or manner. But it is quite 
likely that such a limit would burden one side of the debate more than the other. The 
greater the differential, the more the limit on mode or manner would operate to skew 
the debate about the propriety of the mode or manner.  
43 413 U.S. 15 (1973). I say “typically” because it is possible after R.A.V. that the 
regulation of a subset of obscenity could raise the same kind of concerns raised by the 
regulation of a subset of fighting words. For one possible example, consider 18 U.S. 
Code § 48, which creates additional penalties for the subset of obscenity that features 
cruel depictions of animal mistreatment. See below at notes 153-54.  
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broadcast regulations and zoning laws.44 They also appear as a matter 
of application in anti-discrimination law. Under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, sexually explicit speech in the workplace can 
provide evidence of, and indeed embody, a hostile work environment 
constituting sexual harassment.45  
 These restrictions on sexually explicit speech are not traditional 
viewpoint discrimination — they limit the use of sexually explicit 
speech for both those who believe a woman’s place is in the home and 
for those who believe a woman’s place is in the White House or C-suite. 
It does not restrict the expression of views on either side of that debate 
or any other exogenous debate.46 But these regulations do operate as 
manner bias — they restrict the use of sexually explicit language but 
not the use of non-sexual language.  
 Such restrictions certainly discriminate against the view that 
sexually explicit language is appropriate on airwaves, in 
neighborhoods, and in the workplace. Those who believe such 
explicitness is inappropriate do not have their language restricted 
(because they would not use such language anyway), but those who 
believe such language belongs in the workplace cannot use the 
language that best illustrates and embodies their viewpoint. As in the 
Carlin example, the advocates for the controlled mode of speech cannot 
use that speech to puncture the conventional wisdom about the 
possible dangers or harms arising from that mode of speech. Limits on 
sexually explicit speech skew the debate about sexual explicitness. 
  Limits on fraud, deception, and misrepresentation are 
another common example of restrictions on the mode and manner of 
                                               
44 Federal law makes it a crime to utter “any obscene, indecent, or profane language 
by means of radio communication” 18 U.S.C. §1464. See also City of Renton v 
Playtime Theatres, 475 US 41 (1986) (upholding zoning restriction on adult 
theatres). 
45 See, for example, Wolak v Spucci, 217 F3d 157, 160-61 (2d Cir 2000) (“the mere 
presence of pornography in a workplace can alter ‘status of women’ therein”); 
Petrosino v. Bell Atlantic, 385 F3d 210 (2d Cir 2004)(sexually explicit speech in 
workplace supports hostile work environment claim).  
46 If, for example, Title VII is used by regulators or courts to restrict the expression of 
anti-woman views, however voiced, while allowing the expression of anti-man views, 
however voiced, then that would be a traditional viewpoint bias problem, not a 
manner bias problem. In the text I am focusing on the kind of hostile work 
environment case in which the language at issue is actionable because of sexual 
explicitness, not its use in favor of or against an exogenous viewpoint. See Eugene 
Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L Rev 1791 
(1992). 
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speech. Communication that is deceptive is frequently regulated or 
banned; laws governing securities, consumer goods, home sales, and 
other business interactions routinely punish deception, 
misrepresentation, and fraud. Those laws govern speech, and while the 
Court has sometimes expressed skepticism about whether courts 
should be policing the line between truth and falsity broadly,47 laws 
against fraud and misrepresentation have not been thought to raise 
serious First Amendment problems when it comes to commercial 
speech.48   
 The ban does not operate as traditional viewpoint 
discrimination — it is unlawful to lie about the benefits of smoking or 
quitting; unlawful to lie about equity investments or bonds; unlawful to 
lie about the gas mileage of Volkswagens or Toyotas. But laws against 
lying and misrepresentation pose manner bias problems in the same 
way as bans on profane speech do. The restriction on the mode or 
manner of false communication operates as a government 
endorsement of truth over falsehood. In a debate over whether market 
participants should be required by law to tell the truth, the advocates of 
lying cannot use misrepresentation in their arsenal.  
 But these limits on deception do not seem as skewing to public 
debate as limits on profanity or sexual explicitness. That is not because 
there is any real difference as a matter of logic between a ban on 
deceptive speech and a ban on profane or sexually explicit speech. 
Instead, the failure to recognize bans on fraud as viewpoint bias is 
based more on the fact that there is not a salient argument in politics 
and culture about the propriety of lying, as compared with the salience 
of a cultural debate about whether language should be indecent or 
profane. When there is no public debate about the propriety of a mode 
or manner of speech, a limit on that mode or manner will appear 
neutral.  
 
  
                                               
47 See United States v Alvarez, 567 US 709 (2012). The Court seemed to be on the 
verge of protecting a corporate right to lie or mislead in non-commercial situations in 
the case of Nike v Kasky, 539 US 654 (2003), but the Court did not reach the merits. 
48 See Va Pharmacy Bd v Va Consumer Council, 425 US 748, 771 (1976) (extending 
free speech protections to commercial speech but “foresee[ing] no obstacle” to 
dealing with “provably false” or “deceptive or misleading” commercial speech); 
Central Hudson, 447 US at 563 (“The government may ban forms of communication 
more likely to deceive the public than to inform it”). I have argued elsewhere that 
corporate entities can be held to a blanket obligation to avoid fraud even outside the 
commercial speech context. See Kent Greenfield, Corporations Are People Too (And 
They Should Act Like It) 140-45 (2018). 
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II. IS MANNER BIAS UNCONSTITUTIONAL VIEWPOINT BIAS? 
 
 Traditional viewpoint bias is a clear constitutional problem. In 
the modern cases in which the Court has seen it, the Court has been 
firm and uniform in its condemnation of viewpoint discrimination as 
constitutional “poison.” Manner bias, on the other hand, does not raise 
the same level of difficulty as traditional bias but does skew debate 
when there is a salient public discussion about the mode or manner of 
speech being regulated. Is manner bias constitutionally problematic  
 One might think that the answer to this question is an easy “no.” 
The Court has said that regulations governing the time, place, and 
manner of speech, as long as they are not content-based, do not raise 
sufficient worries about speech freedoms to trigger strict scrutiny.49 A 
city ban on sound trucks after 10 pm or a decibel limit for concerts in 
city parks are not seen as raising constitutional problems. And at least 
with regard to profanity, Pacifica implies that it can be regulated in 
certain circumstances without triggering the strictest of judicial 
scrutiny. Moreover, the ubiquity of restrictions on the mode and 
manner of speech is evidence that few regulators and courts have come 
to believe that such limits raise the kind of serious free speech concerns 
meriting strict scrutiny.50 
 But the answer is more complicated, and the Court’s view is less 
clear. Limits on the mode or manner of speech of the kind discussed in 
the previous Part — limits on profanity, sexual explicitness, or 
deception — are indeed content-based, so they are not subject to the 
usual allowance for content-neutral time, place, and manner 
regulations. Moreover, the Court has emphasized the usual rule that 
speakers should be able to choose both the substance and the mode of 
their communication. In Cohen v California, for example, the Court 
struck down the application of a disturbance of the peace ordinance to 
punish a war protester in a municipal building wearing a jacket 
                                               
49 Ward, 491 US 781. 
50 Other areas of federal, state, and local laws place limits on profanity in various 
ways. For example, under Coast Guard regulations, to gain federal registration a 
vessel may not have a name that is or is phonetically identical to obscene, indecent, or 
profane language, or to racial or ethnic epithets. 46 CFR §67.117(b)(3). See also for 
exampls, American Freedom Defense Initiative v Mass Bay Transp Auth, 989 F 
Supp 2d 182, 183 (Mass 2013) (limits on profanity on city-owned buses and 
billboards); Bethel School Dist No 403 v Fraser, 478 US 675, 677–678, 685 (1986) 
(upholding discipline of high school student for profanity at school event). 
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proclaiming “Fuck the Draft.”51 The Court decided that “the State has 
no right to cleanse public debate to the point where it is grammatically 
palatable to the most squeamish among us.”52 Even though the word at 
issue was considered as “more distasteful than most,” Justice John 
Harlan explained that it is “often true that one man’s vulgarity is 
another’s lyric.”53 The Court recognized that the mode or manner of 
speaking is an important aspect of communication: “expression … 
conveys not only ideas capable of relatively precise, detached 
explication, but otherwise inexpressible emotions as well…words are 
often chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive force.”54  
 The Court said something similar in Texas v Johnson, as it 
struck down a state law punishing flag burning. The state argued the 
law did not burden speech because someone wishing to criticize the 
government could do so in a way other than burning a flag. But the 
Court answered that the “enduring lesson” of the First Amendment — 
the notion “that the government may not prohibit expression simply 
because it disagrees with its message” — does not depend “on the 
particular mode in which one chooses to express an idea.”55 Both 
Cohen and Johnson can be read to mean that the choice of mode or 
manner of speech — profanity in Cohen and flag burning in Johnson — 
is an important part of free speech freedoms. 
 Neither, however, said that a limit on mode or manner is itself 
viewpoint discrimination. Cohen was decided before the Court 
routinely articulated its holdings as a function of content or viewpoint 
discrimination, and the Court did not describe its decision using that 
more modern doctrinal terminology. But even so, the ordinance was 
applied to punish expressive content, and that was enough to trigger 
the First Amendment’s protection.56 Whether the ordinance was 
                                               
51 403 US 15 (1971). 
52 Id at 25. 
53 Id. 
54 Id at 26. See also Sable Communications v FCC, 492 US 115 (1989) (striking down 
statute limiting indecent sex conversations by way of telephone); Reno v ACLU, 521 
US 844 (1997)(striking down statutes limiting indecent communication on the 
internet). 
55 Texas v. Johnson, 491 US 397, 416 (1989) 
56 See Cohen, 403 US at 18 (“Cohen could not, consistently with the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments, be punished for asserting the evident position on the 
inutility or immorality of the draft his jacket reflected.”) The Court did worry about 
the importance of viewpoint neutrality, but used the worry to buttress a protection of 
content neutrality. See id at 27 (“Indeed, governments might soon seize upon the 
censorship of particular words as a convenient guise for banning the expression of 
unpopular views.).  
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applied in a viewpoint neutral way was not a material question in the 
case. A factual question may have lurked as to whether Cohen would 
have been arrested if his jacket had read “Fuck the Draft Dodgers” 
rather than “Fuck the Draft.” It is reasonable to believe, given the 
historical context, that he would not have been. If that is true, then his 
arrest would have been a product of traditional viewpoint bias, not 
“manner” bias. In any event, and notwithstanding Cohen’s important 
language reminding us that “one’s man vulgarity is another’s lyric,” the 
case should not be read to decide the doctrinal issue analyzed here — 
whether limits on vulgarity or other modes and manner of speech 
amount to viewpoint bias as opposed to mere content bias. 
  Nor should Johnson be read to establish a doctrinal rule saying 
limits on the mode or manner of communication, with nothing more, 
amount to viewpoint discrimination under the First Amendment. 
There, too, the statute banning flag burning was a regulation of 
expressive content, applied to punish an individual who was engaging 
in core political speech. And even though the statute was written in 
facially neutral terms, the Court made clear it had been adopted and 
applied to pursue a specific point of view about the sanctity and value 
of our national banner.57 Those who burned the flag to protest the 
nation were arrested; those who burned it in respect to dispose of it 
were exempted from the law. As the Court explained, “To conclude that 
the government may permit designated symbols to be used to 
communicate only a limited set of messages would be to enter territory 
having no discernible or defensible boundaries.”58 That is traditional 
viewpoint discrimination of the most obvious and pernicious kind. The 
case cannot be read to say that manner bias alone amounts to 
viewpoint bias. 
 
                                               
57 Johnson, 491 US at 416-17 (“If we were to hold that a State may forbid flag burning 
wherever it is likely to endanger the flag's symbolic role, but allow it wherever 
burning a flag promotes that role — as where, for example, a person ceremoniously 
burns a dirty flag — we would be saying that when it comes to impairing the flag’s 
physical integrity, the flag itself may be used as a symbol …  only in one direction. We 
would be permitting a State to ‘prescribe what shall be orthodox’ by saying that one 
may burn the flag to convey one's attitude toward it and its referents only if one does 
not endanger the flag's representation of nationhood and national unity.”). 
58 Id at 417. 
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 A. R.A.V. and Manner Bias 
 R.A.V. is the case in which the Court comes closest to holding 
that a limit on a mode or manner or speech is viewpoint bias. The 
ordinance at issue was St. Paul’s version of a hate speech code. The law 
provided:  
 
“Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, 
appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not 
limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows 
or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or 
resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion 
or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a 
misdemeanor.”59 
 The state supreme court had previously ruled that the statute 
only covered “fighting words” within the meaning of Chaplinsky v New 
Hampshire — i.e., those words that “by their very utterance inflict 
injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of peace.”60 But the St. 
Paul ordinance did not regulate all fighting words; some words 
arousing “anger, alarm, or resentment” went unregulated by the 
statute. The statute focused on a subset of fighting words that aroused 
such feelings “in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or 
gender.” 
 The Court struck down the ordinance as both content-based and 
viewpoint-based. Even though the category of fighting words had been 
considered prior to the case as “not within the area of constitutionally 
protected speech,”61 the Court saw the ordinance as constitutionally 
problematic because the city had chosen to regulate only a subset of 
fighting words. According to the Court, the ordinance was content-
based because it defined the subcategory according to “specified 
disfavored topics.”62 The ordinance also “in its practical operation … 
                                               
59 St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, St. Paul, Minn, Legis Code § 292.02 
(1990), as quoted in R.A.V., 505 US at 380. 
60 Chaplinsky, 315 US at 571-72. Because the state supreme court was interpreting a 
state statute, the Court considered the state’s interpretation as controlling for 
purposes of the case. R.A.V., 505 US at 381. 
61 R.A.V., 505 US at 383 (quoting Chaplinksy, at 571-72, among other cases). 
62 Id at 391. It remains unclear whether the Court believed that the content basis of 
the statute was sufficient to raise the level of judicial inquiry to strict scrutiny. The 
ordinance was aimed at fighting words, which would normally receive only rational 
basis review. The selection of fighting words as a category is, by definition, a content-
based selection. The ordinance was of course content-based, as is any law aimed at 
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goes even beyond mere content discrimination, to actual viewpoint 
discrimination.” The viewpoint bias of the ordinance meant that the 
ordinance would fail even though the Court conceded the city had a 
compelling interest in “ensur[ing] the basic human rights of members 
of groups that have historically been subjected to discrimination.”63 
The Court implied that a law that discriminated on the basis of 
viewpoint could never be narrowly tailored — the only interest 
“distinctively served” by such a law would be the city’s interest in 
“displaying [its] special hostility towards the particular biases singled 
out.”64  
 Thus, we know that the Court in R.A.V. believed viewpoint bias 
to be a significant constitutional problem. The difficulty in interpreting 
the Court’s opinion is that it was not clear what exactly made the St. 
Paul ordinance viewpoint biased. Was it a law that exhibited traditional 
bias, mandating that one side of a social, political, or cultural debate 
use a smaller set of communicative tools than another side of the same 
debate? Or did the Court read the St. Paul ordinance as exhibiting 
manner bias, limiting the mode or manner of communication for all 
participants in an exogenous debate, but nevertheless seeing that limit 
on the mode or manner of communication to be itself tainted by 
viewpoint bias? At best, the Court’s analysis is muddled on this point.  
 The most straightforward reading of the ordinance was that it 
exhibited manner bias, limiting a mode or manner of communication. 
The manner of communication it targeted was epithets of some kind, 
whether racial, ethnic, or gender-based. The ordinance referenced a 
“burning cross or Nazi swastika” as examples of the subset of fighting 
words it banned, but was also clear that the subset was “not limited to” 
those examples. There is nothing in the ordinance to suggest that it 
could not extend to, for example, Black Lives Matters protesters who 
cried out an anti-white slur, or to feminist counter-protesters crying 
out anti-male epithets during a men’s rights march. There is also 
nothing in the text of the ordinance itself that would require it to be 
                                               
obscenity, threats, libel, commercial fraud, and other areas of low-value speech. 
Moreover, the selection of a sub-set of category of speech within a low-value category 
is not itself problematic unless the subset reveals a viewpoint bias of the government. 
R.A.V., 505 US at 388-90 (describing reasons why the selection of a subset might not 
raise concerns of viewpoint discrimination). It was thus the viewpoint bias of 
ordinance that deserves attention as triggering strict scrutiny. 
63 Id at 395. 
64 Id at 396. 
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used to punish “generic” fighting words — those that did not explicitly 
use racial, ethnic, or gender-specific epithets or terms. 
 This narrow reading of the ordinance was exactly the 
interpretation that the city had urged upon the Court. According to the 
city’s merits brief, the ordinance applied only to “racial, religious, or 
gender-specific symbols” such as “a burning cross, Nazi swastika or 
other instrumentality of like import.”65 The ordinance was thus a limit 
of a subset of mode or manner of speech within fighting words — limits 
that would be applicable to all people expressing all viewpoints. Under 
the city’s interpretation, the ordinance could not be seen as exhibiting 
traditional viewpoint bias — it was not in “practical operation” banning 
all fighting words used in service of racial (or gender or religious) 
hatred but allowing them in service of racial (or gender or religious) 
harmony. Under the city’s interpretation the ordinance was at most 
exhibiting manner bias, banning a subset of fighting words not based 
on the ideas expressed but because of the use of “racial, religious, or 
gender-specific symbols.”  
 In part of Justice Scalia’s opinion, the Court acknowledged this 
reading by the city and even characterized it as a concession. “The city 
concedes in its brief that the ordinance applies only to ‘racial, religious, 
or gender-specific symbols.’”66 If the Court took that limitation 
seriously, it would be difficult to consider the ordinance as embodying 
traditional viewpoint bias. No one would be able to use such “racial, 
religious, or gender-specific” fighting words, whether they were 
advocates of hatred or harmony. For such a limited ordinance to be 
seen as containing viewpoint bias, it would have to be because manner 
bias amounts to unconstitutional viewpoint bias.  
 Thus one common way to read R.A.V. has been to see it as 
designating a ban on a mode or manner of speech as viewpoint biased. 
On this reading, R.A.V. holds that manner bias is the kind of bias that 
constitutes an “egregious” form of content discrimination and is 
presumptively unconstitutional.67 Moreover, this reading of R.A.V. 
                                               
65 Id at 393. 
66 Id. 
67 For examples of decisions of courts that interpreted R.A.V. this way, see State v 
Vawter, 136 N.J. 56, 75 (NJ 1994) (striking down statute punishing a subset of 
threats, saying “our statutes proscribe threats ‘on the basis of race, color, creed or 
religion.’ Under the Supreme Court's ruling in R.A.V., that limitation renders the 
statutes viewpoint-discriminatory and thus impermissible.”); Washington v Talley, 
122 Wn.2d 192 (1993) (striking down portion of state’s anti-harassment law on the 
basis of R.A.V.). See also Court Overturns Stanford University Code Barring Bigoted 
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would make it virtually impossible to craft any regulation on fighting 
words (or, presumably of any other low-value speech such as threats) 
that explicitly limited its focus to racial, ethnic, or gender-based 
epithets.68 
 But the Court’s opinion in R.A.V. also lends itself to a different 
reading, one that is based on a broader interpretation of the St. Paul 
ordinance and which would lead to less dramatic doctrinal 
implications. Two pages before the Court discussed the city’s asserted 
narrow reading of the statute, the Court agreed that the law’s ban of 
“some words — odious racial epithets, for example” would apply to 
“proponents of all views.”69 To that extent, the Court seemed to adopt 
the city’s reading. But the Court went further, saying that other fighting 
words that did not themselves “invoke race, color, creed, religion, or 
gender” — Justice Scalia suggested an example was “aspersions upon a 
person’s mother” — could be used by advocates of harmony but not by 
advocates of hatred.70 That is, “generic” fighting words could be used 
by those arguing in favor of “tolerance and equality” but not by those 
arguing on the other side.71 According to the Court, the city “has no 
authority to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while 
requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry rules.”72  
                                               
Speech, NY Times 28 (March 1, 1995) (Stanford speech code banning “gutter 
epithets” and other insults based on race and sex struck down under state law 
requiring private universities to offer speech protections of public universities); 
Murray, Campus Speech Codes, 24 West St U L Rev at 267- 70 (cited in note 19) 
(discussing Stanford case).  
68 Scholars have interpreted R.A.V. in this very way. See, eg, Nadine Strossen, Hate: 
Why We Should Resist It With Free Speech, Not Censorship 74 (2018) (describing 
R.A.V. as striking down the St. Paul ordinance “because it selectively outlawed only 
‘abusive invective’ that was based on ‘race, color, creed, religion or gender’”; a law 
that is “underinclusive” “embodies viewpoint discrimination”); Chemerinsky, 
Constitutional Law at 1013-14 (R.A.V. “makes it difficult for hate speech codes to 
survive judicial analysis; if they prohibit only some forms of hate, they will be 
invalidated as impermissible content-based discrimination”) (cited in note 20); 
Murray, 24 West St U L Rev at 264-65 (“while speech codes faced an uphill battle 
under the constitutional precedent in place before R.A.V., this decision made it 
virtually impossible for a speech code to pass constitutional muster”) (cited in note 
19); David L. Hudson Jr. & Lata Nott, Hate Speech and Campus Speech Codes, 
Freedom Forum Institute, March 2017 (last accessed Oct 10, 2019) (same). 
69 Id at 391. 
70 Id at 391. 
71 Id. 
72 Id at 392. 
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 By this reading, the ordinance was not viewpoint based because 
it banned all fighting words that themselves invoked race, color, creed, 
sex, and the like. What made the ordinance viewpoint biased was that 
it would ban generic fighting words — something like “you’re a piece of 
shit” — if used by one side of a public debate about race but not if used 
by the other. The ordinance did not “single[] out an especially offensive 
mode of expression.” Instead, the ordinance “proscribed fighting words 
of whatever manner that communicate messages of racial, gender, or 
religious intolerance.”73 This imbalance made it clear to the Court that 
the ordinance was “directed at expression of group hatred”74 — “a 
distinctive idea”75 —  and thus viewpoint biased.  
 This broad reading of the ordinance makes the Court’s opinion a 
commonplace and limited application of the longstanding skepticism 
of traditional viewpoint discrimination. A law cannot empower one 
side of a public debate to use certain words while the other side of a 
public debate cannot. That would be “proscribing speech … because of 
disapproval of the ideas expressed.”76 
 If this is the correct reading of the ordinance, the law indeed 
looks like it was aimed at punishing underlying ideas rather than a 
mode or manner of communication. The law’s defect was its traditional 
viewpoint bias, and the Court’s ruling striking it down was 
straightforward and unsurprising. It also means that R.A.V. should not 
be read to hold that manner bias is constitutionally problematic.  
 R.A.V., then, can be seen as either a case that significantly 
broadened the definition of viewpoint bias to include laws that limit the 
mode and manner of communication (manner bias) or a case that 
merely applied a classic and well-understood understanding of 
traditional viewpoint bias to a statute that criminalized speech on the 
basis of “disapproval of the ideas expressed.”  The distinction matters. 
If R.A.V. is read narrowly, so that worries about viewpoint bias are 
triggered only when the government is picking sides in a cultural, 
social, or political debate, then R.A.V. is merely an iteration of the 
mainstream and conventional understanding of the importance of 
government not punishing citizens for their ideas. If, on the other 
hand, R.A.V. is read broadly to mean that worries about viewpoint bias 
kick in whenever the government punishes or regulates 
communication based on the mode or manner of that communication, 
                                               
73 Id at 393-94 (emphasis added). 
74 Id at 392. 
75 Id at 393. 
76 Id at 382. 
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then a host of regulations become subject to strict scrutiny. R.A.V. did 
not make clear which it was.  
 
 B. Reconciling R.A.V. and Black 
 The Court offered a clue eleven years later in Virginia v Black,77 
which considered a challenge to a Virginia state law that banned cross-
burning. The statute read: 
 
    “It shall be unlawful for any person or persons, with the 
intent of intimidating any person or group of persons, to burn, 
or cause to be burned, a cross on the property of another, a 
highway or other public place.” 
 
This statute was different from the ordinance in R.A.V. in that it 
regulated speech that met the definition of threats rather than the 
definition of fighting words. Those are distinct categories — threats 
focus on the fear caused by a promise of violence against the hearer, 
while the category of fighting words focus on words creating a 
likelihood of violence against the speaker caused by the hearer’s anger 
or distress at the speaker’s words. But both are categories of speech 
long thought to be low value, regulable without triggering strict 
scrutiny.78  
 The question, then, was whether the Virginia statute raised the 
same constitutional difficulties presented by the statute in R.A.V.. Both 
statutes identified a subset of a less-protected category of speech for 
special regulation. In both cases, the subset of highly-regulated speech 
was identified with regard to its tendency to intimidate or alarm on the 
basis of a characteristic that subjected people to discrimination and 
prejudice. The St. Paul ordinance made that connection explicit, 
identifying the traits (“race, color, creed, religion or gender”) at which 
the fighting words had to be targeted to be actionable. The Virginia law 
did not make the link explicit, though the long history of using cross-
burnings as a way to threaten African Americans was clear and well 
                                               
77 538 US 343 (2003). 
78 See id at 359 (“The First Amendment permits ‘restrictions upon the content of 
speech in a few limited areas, which are “of such slight social value as a step to truth 
that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social 
interest in order and morality.’”) (quoting R.A.V., 505 US at 382—383, and 
Chaplinsky, 315 US at 572). 
 Trademarks, Hate Speech, and Viewpoint Bias 
 26 
understood.79 The Virginia law was also narrower in that it was aimed 
only at cross burning, and the St. Paul ordinance allowed prosecutions 
for the use of symbols other than burning crosses, such as a “Nazi 
swastika or other instrumentality of like import.”80 
  One might expect that given R.A.V., the law in Black would be 
even more problematic as a matter of viewpoint bias. It was certainly 
content based, in that it regulated one kind of content (the burning of 
crosses to intimidate and threaten) more than other kinds of content 
(the use of curse words to intimidate and threaten, for example). And 
because the law was even more targeted than the one in St. Paul, it 
could be said to have been even more viewpoint based, in that it was 
based on a view that the kind of racial hatred embodied in cross 
burning was worse than other kinds of threats, even those based on 
sex, religion, or creed. In fact, the Virginia Supreme Court had struck 
down the cross-burning statute as “analytically indistinguishable” from 
the St. Paul ordinance because it “selectively chooses only cross 
burning because of its distinctive message.”81 
 But the United States Supreme Court upheld the part of the 
Virginia statute banning cross burning for the purpose of intimidation 
and threat.82 The Court believed the law survived R.A.V. because the 
reason for focusing on the subset of cross burning threats was the same 
reason that all threats are punishable.83 In R.A.V., the Court had said 
that an exception to its skepticism of creating subsets of speech 
categories might arise when the subcategory is identified and regulated 
for reasons that are identical to the reason the entire category receives 
lesser First Amendment protections. And the Court in Black said that 
“The First Amendment permits Virginia to outlaw cross burnings done 
with the intent to intimidate because burning a cross is a particularly 
virulent form of intimidation” with a “long and pernicious history as a 
signal of impending violence.”84 
                                               
79 Which the Court acknowledged. See, for example, 538 US at 352 (“Burning a cross 
in the United States is inextricably intertwined with the history of the Ku Klux 
Klan.”). 
80 R.A.V., 505 US at 393. 
81 Black, 538 US at 351. 
82 The Court struck down the part of the law that established a prima facie evidentiary 
presumption that the burning of a cross amounted to a threat. Black, 538 US at 363-
68 (O’Connor) (plurality). 
83 Id at 361-62. 
84 Id at 363. 
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 The problem with this rationale is that if threats based on race 
are regulable because they are an especially dangerous subset of 
threats, the same should have been true in R.A.V. itself. The defendants 
in both cases had burned a cross on the yard of a black family.85 For 
Black to be correct that the Virginia statute constitutionally punished 
cross burning and R.A.V. to be correct that the St. Paul ordinance 
unconstitutionally punished cross burning, one would have to believe 
that a subset of threats based on race can be punished more than 
generic threats, but that a subset of fighting words based on “race, 
color, creed, religion or gender” cannot be punished more than generic 
fighting words. In both cases, the reason why threats and fighting 
words are regulable — that their propensity to induce fear and violence 
outweighs their value in the “exposition of ideas” (to quote 
Chaplinsky)86 — is doubly true when those words are aimed at people 
because of some characteristic that has historically been the basis of 
social prejudice, bias, violence, and hatred. The Court recognized this 
truth in Black but not in R.A.V..87 
 Perhaps one could distinguish the cases by saying that Virginia 
punished the most dangerous kind of threat given its history, but that 
St. Paul punished more than the most dangerous fighting words. 
According to Chaplinsky, fighting words are those that are “likely to 
provoke the average person to retaliation,”88 which will turn on a 
judgment of what the “average” person responds to with violence. Such 
a formulation has obvious gender and power discrepancies — those 
with less power will respond less often with violence than those with 
more prerogative. “You’re an asshole” aimed at an “average” male may 
be more likely to provoke violence than “you’re a whore” aimed at the 
“average” female, even though the latter would be fighting words based 
on “race, color, creed, religion or gender.” That difference is an 
unfortunate outcome of a test for fighting words that bases its 
                                               
85 R.A.V., 505 US at 379; Black, 538 US at 350. 
86 Chaplinsky, 315 US at 572. 
87 In fact, of the seven justices who were on the Court for both cases, four of them 
believed the cases should come out identically. That is, two of the justices (Stevens 
and O’Connor) believed that the St. Paul ordinance was viewpoint neutral and also 
believed the Virginia ordinance was constitutional (either because it was viewpoint 
neutral or fell into one of the R.A.V. exceptions). Another two (Kennedy and Souter) 
believed both statutes to be unconstitutionally viewpoint-based. The difference in 
outcome in the two cases was driven by the three justices (Rehnquist, Scalia, and 
Thomas) who switched from voting to strike down the St. Paul ordinance as 
viewpoint-based to voting to uphold the Virginia law.  
88 Chaplinsky, 315 US at 574. 
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definition on the likelihood that the hearer will react violently.89 But if 
taken seriously, that would ironically suggest that the St. Paul 
ordinance, which included gender as one of its identifiers, was further 
away from the core of fighting words than the Virginia law was from 
the core of threats.90 
 Another, less problematic, way to distinguish the outcomes in 
R.A.V. and Black would be to focus on the difference between 
traditional viewpoint bias and manner bias. This differentiation would 
take seriously the Court’s intimations in R.A.V. that the St. Paul 
ordinance was in fact a cloak for traditional viewpoint bias. In this 
reading of R.A.V., the ordinance was best read broadly, to penalize not 
only fighting words using specific symbols but also generic fighting 
words that advocated racial, ethnic, and gender hatred. And because 
the ordinance ranged so broadly it was best seen as a law flawed by 
traditional viewpoint bias.  
 In Black, on the other hand, the law was a limitation on a 
specific mode or manner of speaking — a threat using a specific symbol 
— and would be applied to whomever used that specific mode or 
manner, regardless of the viewpoint of the speaker. The law banned a 
threatening use of a burning cross whether it was aimed at a black 
                                               
89 See Melody L. Hurdle, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul: The Continuing Confusion of the 
Fighting Words Doctrine, 47 Vand L Rev 1143 (1994) (“fighting words may cause 
certain persons to withdraw, not fight, because individuals subject to verbal abuse 
often internalize their harm rather than escalate to conflict”); Cynthia Grant 
Bowman, Street Harassment and the Informal Ghettoization of Women, 106 Harv L 
Rev 517, 560-61 (1993) (“Unfortunately, the fighting words standard, as it has been 
interpreted thus far, is based upon a male stereotype; it presupposes an encounter 
between two persons of relatively equal power who have been socialized to respond to 
insults with violence. Although men may react to abusive language by engaging in a 
physical fight, women are neither socialized to fight in general nor secure enough - 
for good reason - to do so in a street harassment situation. Far from fighting back, the 
average female target of street harassment is likely to react with fear, to freeze, and to 
pretend to ignore what is happening to her.”); 
Kent Greenwalt, Insults and Epithets: Are They Protected Speech?, Rutgers L Rev 
287, 296-97 (1990) (“The Chaplinsky language reflects the propensity of courts to 
imagine male actors for most legal problems.”); Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to 
Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story, 87 Mich L Rev 2320, 2355 (1989) 
(“insults of such dimension that they bring men — this is a male-centered standard — 
to blows are subject to a first amendment exception”). 
90 This discussion assumes that the definition of fighting words is not expanded by 
the Chaplinsky phraseology that they include words that “by their very utterance 
inflict injury.” Id at 771-72. If this adds to, rather than replicates, the attention the 
test pays to potential violence, then the St. Paul ordinance would be on stronger 
footing and the difference between the holdings in R.A.V. and Black less reconcilable. 
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family or a white family, a cleric or an atheist, a fan of the Virginia 
Cavaliers or the Richmond Spiders. As the Court said in Black, “Unlike 
the statute at issue in R. A. V., the Virginia statute does not single out 
for opprobrium only that speech directed toward ‘one of the specified 
disfavored topics.’”91 The Court emphasized that “as a factual matter it 
is not true that cross burners direct their intimidating conduct solely to 
racial or religious minorities” and the statute would apply to 
threatening cross burnings directed at people for other reasons, such as 
union membership.92 In other words, the law was not viewpoint biased 
in a traditional way, even though it did create a very specific limit on 
the mode or manner of expressing a threat.  
 This reading of R.A.V. and Black would suggest that while 
traditional viewpoint bias remains especially “egregious” from a First 
Amendment perspective, manner bias does not raise particular 
constitutional difficulties. But neither Court described its holding in 
this way.  
 
III. THE TRADEMARK CASES AND MANNER BIAS 
 
 The two trademark cases decided by the Court over the past 
three Terms were both decided on the basis that the challenged 
language of the Lanham Act discriminated on the basis of viewpoint. In 
Tam, the Court struck down the law’s ban on the registration of 
“disparaging” marks. In Brunetti, the Court struck down the law’s ban 
on the registration of “immoral” or “scandalous” marks. While there 
was no majority opinion in Tam, Justice Elena Kagan penned a short, 
punchy opinion in Brunetti that garnered six votes. Implicit in the 
opinion is a distinction between traditional viewpoint bias and manner 
bias. This difference was made explicit in the separate concurrence of 
Justice Alito, and in the opinions concurring in part and dissenting in 
part by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Stephen Breyer and 
Sonia Sotomayor. Brunetti may thus be more than a straightforward 
trademark case. Brunetti may represent the clearest statement by the 
Court to date that manner bias does not constitute the kind of 
viewpoint bias the Court considers presumptively unconstitutional. 
 
  
  
                                               
91 Black, 538 US at 362, quoting R.A.V., 505 US at 391. 
92 Id. 
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A. Brunetti’s Narrow View of Viewpoint Bias 
 The language at issue in Brunetti was the Lanham Act’s 
prohibition of the registration of “immoral” or “scandalous” 
trademarks. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) had denied 
the trademark application of Erik Brunetti, “an artist and entrepreneur 
who founded a clothing line that uses the trademark FUCT.”93 The 
Lanham Act created a federal registration system for trademarks, and a 
successful federal registration affords certain benefits to the trademark 
registrant. The Act prohibits registrations of marks that would create 
confusion among consumers, are “merely descriptive” of the goods so 
marked, or are deceptive. There are a handful of other restrictions as 
well, including a prohibition on the registration of marks that use the 
flag of a state or a country, or that depict a living person or a (recently) 
dead President.94 
 Brunetti challenged the denial of his registration application, 
arguing that the ban on “immoral” and “scandalous” marks violated the 
First Amendment. The law was clearly content-based, since it required 
the PTO to make judgments about marks based on the content of those 
marks. This is true not only for the “immoral” and “scandalous” 
restrictions, but also for the other restrictions of marks based on their 
deceptiveness, their probability of causing confusion, and their use of 
flags or likenesses of dead Presidents. But the content basis of the law 
was not enough to require strict scrutiny alone. Though the Court did 
not explicitly explain, the reason was likely that trademark registration 
is best seen as the regulation of commercial speech and thus subject to 
intermediate scrutiny unless there is some reason — e.g., viewpoint 
bias — to increase the level of scrutiny.95 Another possible reason that 
attentiveness to content would not alone be sufficient to necessitate 
strict scrutiny is that the entire field of trademark law requires the 
regulation of content.96 It would be nonsensical to allow the 
                                               
93 Brunetti, 139 S Ct at 2294. 
94 The bar on using a likeness of a live person can be waived with the person’s 
consent; the bar on the use of a Presidential likeness ends at the death of the 
President’s “widow.” 15 USC sec. 1052 (c). Presumably, “widow” will be read to mean 
“widower” or “spouse” going forward. 
95 See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. 557. 
96 See Brunetti, 139 S Ct at 2306 (Breyer concurring in part and dissenting in 
part)(“Moreover, while a restriction on the registration of highly vulgar words 
arguably places a content-based limit on trademark registration, it is hard to see why 
that label should be outcome-determinative here, for regulations governing 
trademark registration inevitably involve content discrimination.”)(internal 
quotation omitted); Sonia K. Katyal, Trademark Intersectionality, 57 UCLA L Rev 
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registration of trademarks only if such registration could be performed 
without attention to content. Registration is the protection of marks, 
based on their content. Such regulation, in the words of the Court in 
R.A.V., present “no realistic possibility that official suppression of ideas 
is afoot.”97 
 For Brunetti to win, he had to show more than that the statute 
discriminated on the basis of content; he had to show it discriminated 
on the basis of viewpoint. That would raise the level of scrutiny from 
whatever it was — the Court never said for sure — to strict scrutiny. 
Because of R.A.V., we know that viewpoint bias requires strict scrutiny 
even when it appears in a regulation otherwise receiving only rational 
basis review. Even if the Lanham Act would otherwise survive rational 
or intermediate scrutiny, it would require strict scrutiny as a matter of 
First Amendment law if the Court determined it discriminated on the 
basis of viewpoint. 
 Whether the Act exhibited traditional viewpoint bias or manner 
bias turned on a question of statutory interpretation. Like the 
ordinance in R.A.V., the speech restriction could be read either of two 
ways, one creating traditional viewpoint bias and the other only 
manner bias. One way to read the statute would be to have the words 
“immoral” and “scandalous” be a limitation on marks that promoted 
depravity and wickedness, while allowing marks that favored civility 
and decency. This would suggest a traditional viewpoint discrimination 
against the idea of immorality, conventionally described. The other way 
to read the statute was to see the words as imposing a mode or manner 
limitation, similar to a limit on profanity.  
 If the Court had ignored or muddled the statutory question, as it 
had done in R.A.V., readers of the opinion might assume that the 
statutory question did not matter — that the difference between 
traditional bias and manner bias was not a constitutional difference. 
But the Court did focus on the statutory question, and the 
disagreement between the Court’s opinion and the opinions of Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer and Sotomayor turned on this very 
difference. Most of the Court read the statute as exhibiting traditional 
viewpoint discrimination — as restricting marks not on the basis of 
their mode or manner but because of their viewpoint in favor of civility, 
decency, and morality, and against depravity and scandal. A minority 
of the Court read the statute, at least in part, to impose a mode or 
                                               
1601, 1602 (2010) (trademark law is “indelibly rooted in content-based 
considerations”). 
97 R.A.V., 505 US at 390. 
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manner limitation. And every Justice who interpreted a portion of the 
statute that way would have voted to uphold that portion. 
  1. Sotomayor 
 It is easiest to understand these alternate readings by studying 
Justice Sotomayor’s separate opinion. Sotomayor believed the 
restriction on “immoral” marks should be read separately from the 
limitation on “scandalous” marks, and she believed the best reading of 
“immoral” was that it imposed a traditional viewpoint bias on 
trademark registrations. “[T]here is no tenable way” to read “immoral” 
other than to “connote[] a preference for ‘rectitude and morality’ over 
its opposite.”98 In this respect Sotomayor agreed with Justice Kagan’s 
opinion for the Court. A limitation on “immoral” marks “infringes the 
First Amendment” because, as Justice Kagan said, it “disfavors certain 
ideas”99 — namely the idea of immorality. The provision was not 
neutral — it was a thumb on the scale of rectitude and uprightness as 
defined by conventional social and cultural mores. Marks consistent 
with morality could win registration under this provision, and those 
that were not consistent with morality could not be registered.100 This 
was traditional viewpoint bias, and the Court unanimously saw it as 
such. 
 But Sotomayor saw the limitation on “scandalous” marks 
differently. She conceded that the ban on scandalous marks could be 
seen as “something similar to ‘immoral’ and thus favor some 
viewpoints over others.”101 That is, it could be read to create a 
traditional viewpoint bias problem. But the better reading of the 
statute, she believed, was that it was a limitation on mode or manner. 
“To say that a word or image is ‘scandalous’ can instead mean that it is 
simply indecent, shocking, or generally offensive.”102 Sotomayor made 
the distinction explicit: “The word ‘scandalous’  . . . can be read broadly 
(to cover both offensive ideas and offensive manners of expressing 
ideas), or it can be read narrowly (to cover only offensive modes of 
expression).”103 She distinguished between offensiveness resulting 
                                               
98 Brunetti, 139 S Ct at 2309 (Sotomayor), quoting the Court’s opinion, 139 S Ct at 
2299.  
99 Id at 2297. 
100 For example, the PTO denied registration to marks glamorizing drug use but 
granted them for marks urging sobriety. The PTO granted registration to pro-
religious marks but denied marks that seemed to denigrate religion. See 139 S Ct at 
2300-01. 
101 Id at 2309. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
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“from the views expressed” and offensiveness “result[ing] from the way 
in which those views are expressed.” 
 Sotomayor made a strong statutory argument that “scandalous” 
should be read to focus on an offensive mode of communication while 
“immoral” is best read to cover ideas offensive on their own accord. But 
one need not take a position on the statutory question to recognize that 
the doctrinal implication of Justice Sotomayor’s narrow reading is 
significant. Sotomayor argued that if focused only on the mode or 
manner of communication, the “scandalous” limitation of Lanham Act 
would not constitute viewpoint bias, would not require strict scrutiny, 
and would survive. That is, Sotomayor says more clearly than in any 
other Supreme Court case that manner bias is not constitutionally 
problematic. “Properly narrowed, ‘scandalous’ is a viewpoint-neutral 
form of content discrimination that is permissible in the kind of 
discretionary program or limited forum typified by the trademark 
registration system.”104 She explains that “restrictions on particular 
modes of expression do not inherently qualify as viewpoint 
discrimination” because they do not target “particular views taken by 
speakers on a subject.”105  
 Sotomayor even describes a hypothetical about sexually explicit 
communication similar to the one spelled out above in Part I. “Some 
people,” she says, “may have the viewpoint that society should be more 
sexually liberated and feel that they cannot express that view 
sufficiently without the use of pornographic words or images. That 
does not automatically make a restriction on pornography into 
viewpoint discrimination, despite the fact that such a restriction limits 
communicating one’s views on sexual liberation in that way.” In other 
words, limitations on the mode and manner of communication is not 
unconstitutionally viewpoint-based even when there is a social and 
political debate about the appropriateness of that communication.  
 She suggests that under her reading of the statute and her 
reading of First Amendment requirements, a variety of speech 
limitations should survive, including limits on obscene words and 
“lewd or ‘swear’ words that cause a visceral reaction.”106 She also 
implies, by reference to a Coast Guard regulation of vessel names, that 
the use of “racial or ethnic epithets” could be limited. And she laments 
that the Court’s ruling will compel the PTO to register “one particularly 
                                               
104 Id at 2303. 
105 Id at 2313, quoting Rosenberger, 515 US at 829. 
106 Id at 2309. 
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egregious racial epithet”107 — presumably the n-word — though her 
reading of the statute would not. 
 Sotomayor’s opinion is the clearest statement to date that laws 
containing what I have called manner bias — laws that restrict the 
mode or manner of speech — are not what the Court should consider as 
viewpoint-based under the First Amendment. If her view controls a 
majority of the Court, it would provide important doctrinal clarity. 
  2. The Other Justices in Brunetti 
 Clues as to whether Justice Sotomayor’s narrow definition of 
viewpoint bias describes the doctrinal position of the entire Court can 
be gleaned from the votes and other opinions in Brunetti. Justice 
Breyer joined Sotomayor’s opinion, so he can be safely counted as 
holding the same view. He wrote separately to set out his broader 
critique of the Court’s free speech jurisprudence as too formalistic and 
categorically rigid.108 But his judgment with regard to whether a 
restriction on the mode or manner of communication amounts to 
unconstitutional viewpoint bias can be counted with Sotomayor’s.109 
 Chief Justice Roberts also wrote separately. He did not join 
Sotomayor’s opinion, but he announced his agreement with her 
narrower statutory construction of “scandalous” — that it can be read 
to focus on mode or manner — and believed that it could survive First 
Amendment challenge on that reading. “[T]he term “scandalous” need 
not be understood to reach marks that offend because of the ideas they 
convey; it can be read more narrowly to bar only marks that offend 
because of their mode of expression—marks that are obscene, vulgar, 
or profane.”110 
 This correlates with a question the Chief asked in oral argument. 
Counsel for Brunetti, John R. Sommer, was being pressed as to the 
meaning of viewpoint discrimination. He suggested that a limit on 
offensiveness was viewpoint bias because his client’s “viewpoint is, as 
already pointed out, I can be offensive, I don't have to obey the 
authority. And that's viewpoint.” In other words, counsel was arguing 
                                               
107 Id at 2313, & note 5. 
108 Brunetti, 139 S Ct at 2306 (Breyer concurring in part and dissenting in part)(“I 
believe we should focus on the interests the First Amendment protects and ask a 
more basic proportionality question: Does the regulation at issue work harm to First 
Amendment interests that is disproportionate in light of the relevant regulatory 
objectives?”)(internal quotation omitted). 
109 Id at 2306 (“it is hard to see how a statute prohibiting the registration of only 
highly vulgar or obscene words discriminates based on ‘viewpoint’”). 
110 Brunetti, 139 S Ct at 2304 (Roberts concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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that manner bias was unconstitutional because those who disagreed 
with the limitation were silenced. The Chief responded by saying “but 
that's completely circular. It's like saying my protest is that I want to 
use words … not given trademark protection, and because I have that 
viewpoint, you have to give them trademark protection … that’s totally 
circular.”111 This makes clear that with Sotomayor and Breyer, the Chief 
would make three votes in favor of the notion that manner bias does 
not amount to unconstitutional viewpoint bias under the First 
Amendment. 
 The other separate opinion was penned by Justice Alito. He 
joined the Court’s opinion, but he wrote a separate opinion of two 
paragraphs, each making a single clarifying point. First, he emphasized 
the importance of standing firm against viewpoint bias: “Viewpoint 
discrimination is poison to a free society.”112 He asserted that “free 
speech is under attack” in the United States and abroad, and that it was 
“especially important for this Court to remain firm on the principle that 
the First Amendment does not tolerate viewpoint discrimination.”113 
 Nevertheless, Alito posited that “our decision does not prevent 
Congress from adopting a more carefully focused statute” that limits 
trademarks containing “vulgar terms that play no real part in the 
expression of ideas.” Such a redrafted statute would allow the PTO to 
refuse to register Brunetti’s proposed mark, which is “not needed to 
express any idea … and generally signifies nothing except emotion and 
a severely limited vocabulary.”114 This passage makes clear that Alito 
voted to strike down the  “scandalous” language not because he 
believed that regulations of mode or manner of speech are 
constitutionally problematic. Rather, he believed the statute was best 
read as embodying traditional viewpoint bias, and that “we are not 
legislators and cannot substitute a new statute for the one now in 
force.”115 That makes four votes. 
 Justice Kagan’s short opinion for the Court falls short of 
explicitly declaring that manner bias does not constitute viewpoint 
discrimination. But the insinuations are there. Justice Kagan explained 
that the “immoral” and “scandalous” provisions were best read as a 
unitary provision even though they are separated by the adjective 
“deceptive” in the text of the Act. On this interpretation, the two words 
                                               
111 Iancu v Brunetti, Tr of Oral Arg at 38. 
112 Brunetti, 139 S Ct at 2303 (Alito concurring).  
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
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read together “distinguishes between two opposed sets of ideas: those 
aligned with conventional moral standards and those hostile to them; 
those inducing societal nods of approval and those provoking offense 
and condemnation. The statute favors the former, and disfavors the 
latter.”116 
 Kagan thus describes the statute as embodying traditional 
viewpoint bias. Under the PTO’s application of the law, it had “refused 
to register marks communicating ‘immoral’ or ‘scandalous’ views about 
(among other things) drug use, religion, and terrorism. But all the 
while, it has approved registration of marks expressing more accepted 
views on the same topics.”117 The PTO was “disfavoring ‘ideas that 
offend’” and thus “discriminat[ing] based on viewpoint, in violation of 
the First Amendment.”118 
 The government had argued the statute should survive under a 
reading that would limit its application to marks that were “offensive … 
because of their mode of expression, independent of the views that they 
may express.”119 The government argued that such a bar “would not 
turn on viewpoint” and could be upheld by the Court.120 That is, the 
government argued that the Lanham Act embodied manner bias only, 
which did not amount to unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. 
 In answering the government’s contention, the Court did not say 
the distinction was immaterial. Kagan said instead that the statute 
could not bear the narrower reading that it contained manner bias but 
not traditional viewpoint bias. The statute did not, according to the 
Court, “refer only to marks whose ‘mode of expression,’ independent of 
viewpoint, is particularly offensive.” Throughout this passage, Kagan 
continued the distinction between traditional bias and manner bias. 
She implied that a restriction on mode is not a restriction on viewpoint, 
because she juxtaposed the two: the statute “covers the universe of 
immoral or scandalous… whether the scandal or immorality comes 
from mode or instead from viewpoint.”121 In a footnote, she makes the 
point more strongly. In answering Sotomayor’s statutory argument, 
Kagan counters that even if separated from the “immoral” term, “the 
category of scandalous marks thus includes both marks that offend by 
the ideas they convey and marks that offend by their mode of 
                                               
116 Id at 2300. 
117 Id at 2300-01. 
118 Id at 2301. 
119 Id (emphasis in Court’s opinion) (quoting Tr of Oral Arg at 11.) 
120 Id. 
121 Id at 2301-02. 
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expression. And its coverage of the former means that it discriminates 
based on viewpoint.”122  
 Kagan wrote in the same footnote that the Court “say[s] nothing 
at all about a statute that covers only … lewd, sexually explicit, and 
profane marks.” One might read this as saying that the Court remained 
agnostic as to whether such a statute would survive First Amendment 
scrutiny, and as a matter of technical Court practice it is certainly the 
case that a future Court would not feel bound by Brunetti to consider a 
statute containing manner bias as viewpoint neutral. But even this 
throw-away line by Kagan is probably best read not as an affirmative 
claim that manner bias embodies viewpoint discrimination. Instead it 
is best read to mean that there may be First Amendment challenges to 
such a statute other than on the basis that it is viewpoint biased.  
 All in all, as a matter of description and even prediction, 
Brunetti should stand for the proposition that regulations of mode and 
manner of communication will not be viewed by the Court as 
embodying viewpoint discrimination. Four justices say so more or less 
explicitly. And the Court’s opinion by Justice Kagan seems to make the 
same assumption. 
 
 B. Revisiting Tam After Brunetti 
 One possible objection to reading Brunetti to limit the meaning 
of viewpoint bias is that Tam came out the other way. The Court 
decided Tam in 2017, two years before Brunetti, ruling that the so 
called “disparagement clause” of the Lanham Act violated the First 
Amendment because of its viewpoint discrimination.123 The provision 
prohibited the registration of a trademark “which may disparage . . . 
persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or 
bring them into contempt, or disrepute.”124 The PTO had denied 
registration to a rock band’s proposed mark, “The Slants.” The band’s 
lead singer, Simon Tam, chose the name for the band to reclaim what is 
typically a slur and epithet against Asian Americans.125 
 Justice Alito wrote the main opinion, but spoke for the Court 
only in the early, introductory portions. His reasoning for striking 
down the disparagement clause attracted only three other votes (the 
Chief Justice and Justices Thomas and Breyer). Meanwhile, Justice 
Kennedy wrote an opinion for himself and three other justices 
                                               
122 Id at 2302 note *.  
123 Tam, 137 S Ct 1744 (2017). 
124 15 USC §1052(a). 
125 See Tam, 137 S Ct at 1754. 
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(Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan) reaching the same outcome with 
slightly different reasoning. But all eight justices agreed that the 
disparagement clause constituted viewpoint discrimination. (Justice 
Gorsuch took no part in the case.) In a portion of his opinion in which 
he spoke for the entire Court, Alito explained that the provision 
“offends a bedrock First Amendment principle: Speech may not be 
banned on the ground that it expresses ideas that offend.”126 
 Does Tam stand for the proposition that the regulation of mode 
or manner of communication embodies viewpoint discrimination? Or 
is the best reading of Tam’s two opinions consistent with the 
interpretation of Brunetti above? The answer to this depends on if one 
can glean from the opinions whether the justices saw the 
disparagement clause as embodying traditional viewpoint bias or only 
manner bias. If manner bias only, and the Court nevertheless struck 
down the provision as discriminating on the basis of viewpoint, then 
the reading of Brunetti suggested above is less persuasive.  
 Alito’s opinion is not absolutely clear on this point. One passage 
does appear, at first look, to suggest that he found the disparagement 
clause to be about mode or manner rather than ideas. In describing the 
operation of the provision, he said it operates “evenhandedly” by 
banning the “disparagement of all groups.”127 “It applies equally to 
marks that damn Democrats and Republicans, capitalists and 
socialists, and those arrayed on both sides of every possible issue.”128 
The law required the PTO to refuse registration to any mark “that is 
offensive to a substantial percentage of the members of any group.” He 
went on to say that “in the sense relevant here,” such a limitation on 
registration is “viewpoint discrimination” because “giving offense is a 
viewpoint.”129 
 That does sound as if Alito believed that a ban on offensive 
language constitutes viewpoint discrimination. The law would be 
viewpoint biased, “in the sense relevant here” — that is, under the First 
Amendment — because a law that limits offensiveness is discrimination 
against offensiveness. That seems to suggest he thinks the 
disparagement clause presents a problem of manner bias, which 
constitutes viewpoint discrimination under the First Amendment.  
 But the remainder of the opinion did not build on that 
contention. Instead, the opinion is best read as interpreting the 
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disparagement clause as not limiting the mode or manner of offensive 
speech but limiting speech because of the disparaging ideas behind it. 
After the passage in which he said that offensiveness “is a viewpoint,” 
he explained that “the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited 
merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their 
hearers.”130 He quoted the Court’s opinion in Texas v Johnson, the flag 
burning case, repeating “If there is a bedrock principle underlying the 
First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the 
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself 
offensive or disagreeable.”131 Later in the opinion, Alito made clear his 
reading of the statute requires the PTO to refuse marks that disparage 
on the basis of the idea conveyed in the mark rather than the mode or 
manner of the mark. He said the bans would apply “to trademarks like 
the following: ‘Down with racists,’ ‘Down with sexists,’ ‘Down with 
homophobes.’”132 That made clearer that Alito’s disagreement with the 
disparagement clause was not that it regulated the mode or manner of 
speech but that it punished “ideas that offend.”133 
 Kennedy’s opinion, which spoke for four justices, revealed a 
similar conviction that the disparagement clause punished ideas. He 
began his opinion by asserting the “fundamental principle of the First 
Amendment that the government may not punish or suppress speech 
based on disapproval of the ideas or perspectives the speech 
conveys.”134 The Lanham Act, according to Kennedy, acted as a 
requirement to be nice to people — “an applicant may register a 
positive or benign mark but not a derogatory one.”135 The law 
“mandat[ed] positivity.” This might be seen as an indication that 
Kennedy saw the disparagement clause as a limitation on mode or 
manner. But given the opinion’s emphasis on the argument that the 
statute discriminated on the basis of ideas, Kennedy likely interpreted 
the statute as a mandate that marks be supportive of the idea that 
people and groups are praiseworthy and not worthy of scorn. And that 
is traditional viewpoint bias, not manner bias. 
 To be sure, it remains unclear whether Kennedy would have 
signed onto Sotomayor’s opinion in Brunetti making a distinction 
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131 Id at 1764 (quoting Texas v Johnson, 491 US 397, 414 (1989)) (emphasis mine). 
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133 Id at 1751. 
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between traditional viewpoint bias and manner bias for purposes of the 
First Amendment. In all likelihood, Kennedy did not consider the 
distinction in Tam, and he left the Court before Brunetti. But of course 
even if Kennedy did think that regulations of mode or manner 
embodied viewpoint bias, he never said so explicitly and there is 
nothing in Kennedy’s plurality opinion in Tam that would bar the 
Court’s adoption of Sotomayor’s Brunetti taxonomy going forward. Not 
only was his opinion in Tam not an opinion for the Court, Justice 
Sotomayor joined him. It would be unusual for Sotomayor to sign onto 
an opinion in Tam that she believed was inconsistent with her views in 
Brunetti two years later. Brunetti’s doctrinal analysis of viewpoint bias 
(springing both from Kagan’s majority and Sotomayor’s separate 
opinion) is more uniform, coherent, and sophisticated than anything in 
either opinion in Tam. 
 
IV. VIEWPOINT BIAS AFTER BRUNETTI 
 
 It would be easy for Brunetti to be ignored by scholars as a 
small-bore decision in the narrow field of trademark law. What’s more, 
one could see its outcome as unsurprising and even pre-ordained given 
the outcome in Tam two years before. But Brunetti is more significant 
than that. Reading the various opinions together, Brunetti offers more 
clarity on what does and does not constitute viewpoint discrimination 
as a matter of First Amendment doctrine than in any case in decades. 
Remember that viewpoint bias is only doctrinally material in a small 
subset of First Amendment cases — that is, when content 
discrimination itself is insufficient to trigger strict scrutiny. That means 
that the Court has few opportunities to define the contours of 
viewpoint bias, which the Court readily admits is slippery and 
imprecise.136 Brunetti should be taken seriously, therefore, as the most 
recent and most revealing statement by the Court to date about the 
limits of what constitutes viewpoint discrimination. 
 This final part will describe what is the best understanding of 
viewpoint discrimination after Brunetti and then describe some of the 
implications of this new, clearer, and narrower understanding. 
                                               
136 See Rosenberger, 515 US at 831 (“[T]he distinction is not a precise one”); Brunetti, 
139 S Ct at 2313 (Sotomayor concurring in part and dissenting in part) (saying the 
definition of viewpoint bias is “slippery”); Brunetti, 139 S Ct at 2305-06 (Breyer 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“As for the concepts of ‘viewpoint 
discrimination’ and ‘content discrimination,’ I agree with Justice Sotomayor that the 
boundaries between them may be difficult to discern.). 
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 A. Manner Bias Does Not Count as Viewpoint Bias 
 Brunetti reaffirms that traditional viewpoint discrimination is 
an “egregious form of content discrimination”137 that triggers strict 
scrutiny and is presumptively a violation of the First Amendment. That 
is, the government discriminates on the basis of viewpoint when it 
regulates private communication in such a way so as to support or 
hinder an idea, point of view, opinion, or perspective, as compared to 
competing ideas, points of view, opinions, or perspectives. Regulations 
of fighting words that punish those who use such words to call for 
racial conflict, but do not punish those who use such words to call for 
racial harmony, discriminate on the basis of viewpoint. Regulations 
that grant trademark protections to marks that urge morality and 
decency, but deny protections to marks urging depravity, discriminate 
on the basis of viewpoint.  
 But regulations of mode and manner of speech do not constitute 
viewpoint bias under the First Amendment and should not be seen as 
an “egregious form of content discrimination.” That is, the government 
does not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint when the government 
regulates private speech in such a way as to discourage or punish a 
mode or manner of communication. This is true even when there is a 
salient public debate about whether such mode or manner should be 
regulated. A ban on profane trademarks, for example, does not 
discriminate on the basis of viewpoint. A ban on threats that contain 
racial epithets does not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint. A 
restriction on sexually explicit displays in workplaces does not 
discriminate on the basis of viewpoint. 
 To be clear, to say that these regulations of mode or manner of 
communication do not embody viewpoint bias is not to say that they 
should survive First Amendment challenge. Strict scrutiny might by 
triggered for other reasons. Courts may see regulations that are 
viewpoint neutral as nevertheless discriminating on the basis of 
content, subject to the longstanding rule that content discrimination 
presumptively triggers strict scrutiny.138 Or limits on mode or manner 
that are applied in a non-neutral way would be viewpoint biased in 
application even if not facially. For example, the outcome in Cohen, the 
“fuck the draft” case, does not need rethinking under this 
                                               
137 See Rosenberger, 515 US at 829. See also Brunetti, 139 S Ct at 2299 (quoting 
Rosenberger); Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U S at 394 (“[T]he First Amendment forbids the 
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understanding of viewpoint bias. Limits on profanity in public places 
are regulations of content and presumptively subject to strict scrutiny 
even if applied evenhandedly to those protesting the draft and those 
protesting draft dodgers. And if a ban on profanity is selectively applied 
to draft protesters but not draft-dodging protesters, then the profanity 
ban is in application exhibiting traditional viewpoint bias rather than 
merely manner bias; it is no longer viewpoint neutral.  
 Consider again R.A.V. in this context. After Brunetti, the best 
reading of that case is that the Court thought of the city ordinance as 
imposing a limit on fighting words used to express the idea of racial 
disharmony, while not imposing a limit on fighting words used to 
express the idea of racial harmony. That is traditional viewpoint 
discrimination. If instead the Court had read the ordinance as banning 
all fighting words containing a racial epithet — but not banning 
“generic” fighting words even if they expressed the idea of racial 
disharmony — then the ordinance would have embodied only manner 
bias and would not have triggered strict scrutiny. 
 
 B. Some Implications 
 Consider a few concrete implications of this more precise 
understanding of viewpoint discrimination. First, and most obviously, 
Congress could amend the Lanham Act as Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justices Alito, Breyer, and Sotomayor suggested in their separate 
writings. There is little doubt that the Court would uphold a new 
provision prohibiting the registration of marks containing words that 
are “obscene,” “lewd,” “profane,” or “vulgar.”139 
 Congress could also amend the Lanham Act — as Justice 
Sotomayor suggested in her concurrence — to bar the registration of 
marks containing “racial or ethnic epithets.”140 If properly applied by 
the PTO, such a limit should be seen as a limit on mode or manner of 
communication rather than a discrimination against racist viewpoints. 
A restriction of racist epithets is not the same as a restriction on the 
communication of racist ideas, and a framework of trademark 
registration that prohibited the registration of marks containing 
epithets would not be seen as discriminating on the basis of viewpoint. 
This is true even though the broader disparagement clause was struck 
down in Tam. That clause banned disparagement generally, regardless 
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of the mode or manner in which it was communicated. A narrower ban 
on racial epithets should survive. This distinction is strengthened by 
reference to Virginia v Black, the case that upheld Virginia’s ban on 
threats made by way of burning a cross. The ban on cross burning in 
that case was a limit on the mode or manner of expressing a threat, and 
the Court did not see it as discriminating on the basis of viewpoint.   
 These points can be generalized to other First Amendment 
contexts in which content discrimination alone does not trigger strict 
scrutiny. In a limited public forum, for example, limits on the mode or 
manner of communication should not trigger the exacting scrutiny that 
comes with viewpoint discrimination.141 One application would be 
schools’ or universities’ limits on lewd language and epithets that 
reference racial, sexual, ethnic, or other characteristics. In light of 
Brunetti, such limits on the mode or manner of communication in 
educational settings should be upheld, as long as the forum in question 
is correctly seen as a limited public forum (as opposed to a public 
forum).142  
 One way to characterize this reading of Brunetti is as a caution 
to not over-read or over-emphasize R.A.V.. Before Brunetti, it would be 
easy to interpret R.A.V. as creating a broad definition of viewpoint bias 
that would doom virtually any attempt to draft a so-called hate speech 
code.143 As explored in Part II above, it was possible before Brunetti to 
read R.A.V. to mean that a law discriminates on the basis of viewpoint 
if it identifies a subset of speech for extra penalties by reference to that 
subset’s focus on racial, sexual, ethnic, or other such characteristics. 
This was not the only way to read Justice Scalia’s opinion in R.A.V., but 
it was a reasonable way to read it.144 Now, however, such a broad 
                                               
141 If, however, public officials were to apply such limits on mode or manner to benefit 
a point of view or the other, then the limits would of course violate the presumption 
against viewpoint bias. See Ward, 491 US at 791 (“The government’s purpose is the 
controlling consideration.”). 
142 See Bethel School Dist No 403 v Fraser, 478 US 675, 685 (1986) (treating 
punishment of “offensively lewd and indecent speech” as viewpoint neutral). 
143 See Murray, 24 West St U L Rev at 264-65 (“while speech codes faced an uphill 
battle under the constitutional precedent in place before R.A.V., this decision made it 
virtually impossible for a speech code to pass constitutional muster”) (cited in note 
68); Hudson & Nott, Hate Speech and Campus Speech Codes, (same)(quoting S. 
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144 See, e.g., Strossen, Hate 74 (describing R.A.V. as striking down the St. Paul 
ordinance “because it selectively outlawed only ‘abusive invective’ that was based on 
‘race, color, creed, religion or gender’”; a law that is “underinclusive” “embodies 
viewpoint discrimination”) (cited in note 69); Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law at 
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reading of R.A.V. is less convincing. Instead, R.A.V. should be read as a 
straightforward application of the Court’s longstanding rule against 
traditional viewpoint bias.145 In other words, the ordinance in St. Paul 
should have survived if it were a law punishing racist epithets, 
assuming it was applied equally to speakers on all sides of the racial 
divides in the city.  
 Another possible application of this new narrower interpretation 
of viewpoint bias is to so called “gruesome speech.”146 According to 
Eugene Volokh, “recent years have seen a striking” number of instances 
in which “courts have concluded that [content-based] restrictions on 
the public display of ‘gruesome images,’ usually of aborted fetuses, are 
permissible” under the First Amendment.147 Some jurisdictions have 
sought limits or punishments for the display of graphic depictions of 
not only aborted fetuses, but also victims of murder, violence, or other 
abuse.148 Perhaps also included in this speech category could be so-
called “crush videos” — depictions of the maiming or killing of animals, 
usually done for sexual pleasure.149  
 These limits on gruesome displays would certainly be content 
based, in that they create regulations that depend entirely on the 
                                               
1013-14 (R.A.V. “makes it difficult for hate speech codes to survive judicial analysis; if 
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presumption against content-based discrimination within categories of unprotected 
speech”). 
145 More precisely: The ordinance in St. Paul was not a ban on (a subset of) a subset of 
speech based on the mode or manner of that communication, but a ban on (a subset 
of) a subset of speech based on the point of view that speech conveyed. The ordinance 
only applied to a subset of a fighting words, itself a subset of speech.  
146 See Eugene Volokh, Gruesome Speech, 100 Cornell L Rev 901 (2015). 
147 Id at 902. Volokh cites the following cases as embodying this trend: Frye v Kan 
City Mo Police Dep’t, 375 F3d 785, 790–91 (8th Cir 2004); Tatton v City of 
Cuyahoga Falls, 116 F Supp 2d 928, 931, 934 (ND Ohio 2000); Saint John’s Church 
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(stating that a restriction on gruesome images focused on shielding young children 
would be constitutional); Operation Save America v City of Jackson, 275 P3d 438, 
460–61 (Wyo 2012) (similar).  
148 Volokh, Gruesome Speech at 910-11 (cited in note 141). 
149 See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (striking down 18 U. S. C. §48, a 
federal law criminalizing the commercialization of animal crush videos, as 
overbroad). 
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content of the speech.150 But they would not be viewpoint based, even 
though they embed within them a view that gruesomeness is a 
problematic subset of speech. Volokh agrees: “All these restrictions are 
viewpoint-neutral—they ban pictures of nudity, vulgarities, or violent 
images without regard to the viewpoint that the words or images are 
used to convey.”151 That would mean, for example, that limits on 
gruesome speech could very well survive in limited public fora, where 
content discrimination alone does not trigger strict scrutiny.152 
 Another implication would be that the current version of the 
federal law criminalizing animal “crush videos” is constitutional. In 
2010, the Court struck down a previous version of the law as content 
based and overbroad.153 Congress quickly amended and re-passed the 
statute, but limited its scope to only those videos that depict defined 
animal cruelty and that are also obscene.154 In other words, Congress 
identified a subset of obscenity — that which portrays cruelty to 
animals — as subject to heightened penalties. Because Congress is 
making content distinctions within the category of obscenity, a 
category of “low-value” speech the regulation of which does not 
ordinarily trigger strict scrutiny, the law should only require strict 
scrutiny if the law fails R.A.V.’s bar on the selection of subcategories for 
reasons of viewpoint bias. But we know after Brunetti that the selection 
of a subcategory by reason of a mode or manner such as gruesomeness 
is not discriminating on the basis of viewpoint. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
 In a compact and efficient opinion for the Court in Iancu v 
Brunetti, Justice Elena Kagan reaffirmed “a core postulate” of the First 
Amendment: that “government may not discriminate against speech 
                                               
150 See Volokh, Gruesome Speech at 911 (“Under well-established First Amendment 
doctrine, such statutes are content-based because they ban depictions of particular 
acts or things .”) (cited in note 141). 
151 Id at 912.  
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facially viewpoint-neutral, even though it disproportionately affects some viewpoints. 
The restriction would still be content-based, but it would be viewpoint-neutral, and 
that is sufficient in nonpublic fora and limited public fora.”). 
153 See Stevens, 559 US 460. 
154 See 18 U.S. Code § 48; Pub. L. 111–294, § 2, Dec. 9, 2010, 124 Stat. 3177. 
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based on the ideas or opinions it conveys.”155 A law that “disfavors 
certain ideas”156 is “presumptively unconstitutional”157 and dooms the 
law in question.158 While the Court occasionally allows content 
discrimination in certain settings and in certain categories of analysis, 
the Court is firm and consistent in its suspicion of viewpoint choices by 
the government. Once a law falls into the “discriminates on the basis of 
viewpoint” box, it is done for. 
 In that respect, Brunetti is an unremarkable, straightforward 
application of longstanding free speech doctrine.159 
 But a significant contribution to that doctrine can be derived 
from the exchange between Kagan’s opinion for the Court and the 
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part by Justice Sonia 
Sotomayor. The disagreement between them was not a matter of free 
speech doctrine but a matter of statutory interpretation. Sotomayor 
read the ban on the registration of “scandalous” trademarks to be a 
manner restriction rather than a viewpoint restriction. As a restriction 
on manner or mode of communication, Sotomayor argued that the 
provision was viewpoint neutral and did not trigger strict scrutiny. At 
least three other justices explicitly agreed with Sotomayor’s description 
that a limit on mode or manner would not trigger the Court’s ire 
against viewpoint bias. And nothing in Kagan’s opinion is inconsistent 
with this understanding of viewpoint bias — the disagreement between 
her and Sotomayor was statutory, not doctrinal. Nor would anything in 
the two plurality opinions in Tam stand in the way of Sotomayor’s 
narrow reading of viewpoint discrimination.  
 This is an important clarification of the Court’s doctrine of 
viewpoint discrimination. It is now clear, for example, that R.A.V. is 
best seen as a case about traditional viewpoint bias, rather than a case 
that stands for a notion that limits on the modes or manner of speech 
discriminate on the basis of viewpoint. Limits on mode or manner of 
communication — including the regulation of profanity, racial epithets, 
sexually explicit speech, or the like — will continue to be 
constitutionally problematic in settings in which content 
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discrimination alone triggers strict scrutiny. But in contexts in which 
content discrimination is not itself sufficient to require strict scrutiny 
— in limited public fora, in commercial speech, or when regulating 
“low-value” speech such as threats and fighting words, for example — 
courts should not presume the unconstitutionality of limits on the 
mode or manner of communication fairly applied to all speakers. 
 This is true even when there is a debate about the mode or 
manner of communication itself.  A ban on racial epithets applied to 
both anti-white and anti-black protesters, for example, is not 
constitutionally identical to a ban on racial epithets applied to only one 
side. Because of Brunetti, we now know that while the latter is correctly 
seen as discriminating on the basis of viewpoint, the former is not. 
 While the exact contours of viewpoint bias main remain 
“slippery,”160 they are clearer than ever before.  
 
 
                                               
160 Brunetti, 139 S Ct at 2313 (Sotomayor concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(quoting Corbin, 83 NYU L Rev at 651). 
